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Abstract
Following Schmeidler (1973) and Mas-Colell (1984), economists have typically
used aggregative games with a continuum of players to model strategic envi-
ronments with a large number of participants. In these games a player’s payoff
depends on her own strategy and on an average of the strategies of everyone in
the game. Examples include corporate competition in global markets, welfare
maximization in multi-period economies, strategic voting in national elections,
network congestion, and environmental models of pollution or, more generally,
widespread externalities.
This study consists of three chapters. In Chapter 1 we unveil a weak-
ness of the Schmeidler - Mas-Colell framework, and we develop a potential
remedy that leaves the framework intact. In Chapter 2 we set the theoret-
ical foundations for an alternative framework that is immune to the above
weakness. Finally, in Chapter 3 we demonstrate how our approach accommo-
dates types of players. We provide a number of fully worked-through examples
and an appendix at the end of each chapter that includes the proofs to our
propositions.
vii
0.1 Summary
Consider the pair of a framework to model strategic environments, and a
solution concept. In our case it is the framework of Schmeidler (1973) and
Mas-Colell (1984), and the solution concept of Nash equilibrium. In Chapter
1 first we1 prove that there is a mismatch between the framework and the
solution concept. Second, we construct a solution concept that works well in
the existing framework.
A game with infinitely-many players (either countably infinitely-many
or uncountably-many players) can be viewed as a limit abstraction of the the
concept of large games. We may study games with infinitely-many players but
since we live in a world with finitely many people, we ultimately want to make
predictions about the outcome of large finite-player games. Therefore, it is
our view that the fitness of such a limit abstraction should be evaluated by
examining how close are (1) its predictions of how the strategic situation with
infinitely-many players will be resolved, to (2) the outcome of large games with
finitely-many players.
In more detail, in Chapter 1 we argue for a new refinement of Nash
equilibrium in purely-aggregative games with a continuum of players. First
we prove that in the above class of games every strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium. We show that in many cases Nash equilibrium strategies of games
with a continuum of players are not best-responses (i.e. they are suboptimal)
1A short note on personal pronouns. Regarding third-person singular pronouns, in this
study my preference is to use “she” for all individuals. Quoting my teacher Martin J.
Osborne: “Obviously this usage is not gender neutral, but its use for a few decades, after
a couple of centuries in which “he” has dominated, seems likely only to help to eliminate
sexist ways of thought.” (Osborne and Rubinstein (1994)). Regarding first-person pronouns,
my preference is to use “we” as a cordial invitation to the reader in a short journey through
the land of large games and their mathematics.
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in any finite-player version of the game. This way we characterize the set of
Nash equilibria that we consider to be implausible. Then we argue that this
weakness is due to a side-effect of assuming a continuum of players. This side-
effect renders players artificially indifferent among their strategies even though
they are not indifferent among outcomes.
We define “Strategic Insignificance” and “Economic Negligibility” and
explain why and how these two concepts differ. We also discuss why the frame-
work of Schmeidler (1973) and Mas-Colell (1984) cannot distinguish between
Strategic Insignificance and Economic Negligibility, and the side-effects of this.
Then we attempt to restore Strategic Significance of players while maintain-
ing their Economic Negligibility. We define “better-response preferences over
strategies” and use them to construct our refinement of Nash equilibrium that
we call “limit-plausible equilibrium”. Throughout this chapter we demon-
strate our results and the superiority of our refinement over the regular Nash
equilibrium through a number of examples. These examples include: welfare
maximization in multi-period economies, competition of firms in a Cournot
market, and strategic voting in elections with seats.
In Chapter 2 our method of treatment is the opposite of that of Chap-
ter 1. We keep the solution concept (Nash equilibrium) unchanged and we
change the framework. We set the theoretical underpinnings for an alternative
framework for the study of large games, that does not give rise to implausible
equilibria. We start virtually from scratch without depending on the existing
economics literature and use only mathematics, new definitions and proposi-
tions. This is because the existing framework (Schmeidler (1973), Mas-Colell
(1984)) is the only well-received approach in the economics literature up to
2
now and as such permeates the related economics literature.2
Our aim is, at minimum, to provide a set of tools for the study of
large games based on mainstream mathematical concepts like sequences, limits,
and distributions. A set of tools that economists with basic knowledge of
topology and measure theory can understand and find useful in studying game
theory. Throughout Chapter 2 we follow closely an example of Cournot market
competition that practically demonstrates our main constructs and results.
In Chapter 3 we apply our set of tools to strategic environments where
participants have complete information and can be grouped into various “types”.
We demonstrate our results thoroughly with an example of Cournot market
game that also allows direct comparison with the results of Chapter 2.
2There are three other approaches that are mathematically elegant but have been adopted
so far only by a handful of economists: Khan and Sun (1999), Al-Najjar (2008), and Lasry,
Lions, and Guant (2011). We mention in some detail these approaches also in Chapter 2.
3
Chapter 1
The Collective-Action Problem
1.1 Introduction
Games with a continuum of players were first introduced by Schmeidler (1973).
One of main results of Schmeidler’s paper is the first proof of pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium existence in non-atomic games with a continuum of players.
Schmeidler achieved this by restricting each player’s payoff function to depend
only on that player’s own strategy and the integral of the strategies of all
players. This integral can be seen as an average of the strategies of all players
in the game. Since then, this restriction on the players’ payoff function appears
in virtually all models of games with a continuum of players, and it imposes
additional structure on the channels through which players interact with each
other. Players cannot affect directly each other’s payoff except through the
aggregate. It is the aggregate that specifies how and to what extent players
can interact with each other. This class of games is now known as “non-atomic
aggregative games”.
In this study we follow the fundamental definition of Nash equilibrium
1
as the strategy profile such that no player can obtain a higher payoff by uni-
laterally changing her strategy. We believe that this definition is particularly
intuitive and speaks of the essence of Nash equilibrium. We also believe that,
at Nash equilibrium, it is not intuitive to allow countably many players to have
chosen strategies that are not best-responses irrespective of the other players’
strategies.
We accommodate a number of standard conventions in economic theory
such as the choice of [0, 1] as the set of players, a compact space of actions,
and other standards of the economics literature. We want this study to fit well
into the relevant economics literature, appeal to game theorists, and provide
insight into the analysis of games with infinitely many players.
Now we provide a straightforward example of a strategic situation that
fits perfectly into the class of games with a continuum of players, and nonethe-
less, gives rise to equilibria that we consider to be implausible.
Elections have been declared! Consider a continuum of voters endowed
with a non-atomic measure and a finite set of parties. Each party is allocated
a finite number of parliamentary seats depending on the number of votes it
receives. Assume that the more seats a party occupies, the better it can serve
the interests of its supporters. We also assume that each voter’s preferences are
complete, strict and single-peaked, which are standard assumptions in models
of strategic voting. By “complete” and “strict” we mean that, given any two
election outcomes, every voter can choose which outcome she prefers more, and
as a consequence of single-peakedness each voter has a globally most-preferred
outcome.
Since voters belong to a continuum set endowed with a non-atomic mea-
sure, any single vote carries zero weight in the determination of the election
2
outcome. This way any individual voter is rendered indifferent between vot-
ing for her most-preferred or least-preferred party or any other party. This
indifference holds not just for a specific voting pattern of the other voters, but
for every voting pattern of the other voters. Given any voting profile, no sin-
gle voter has an incentive to change her vote, whatever that vote may be, and
thus any strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. Considering that a non-atomic
game with a continuum of players has a continuum of strategy profiles, our
voting game has infinitely many Nash equilibria. Note that by assumption
voters are not indifferent with respect to the outcome of the elections; they
are just indifferent between any two of their own strategies. For this reason we
consider all equilibria, except the one where every player votes for her most-
preferable party, to be implausible. Note that, in any finite version of these
elections, a voter will always choose to vote for her most-preferred party, no
matter what the other players have chosen to vote. This is because we have
assumed that the more votes a party receives, the more parliamentary seats it
is assigned, and the better it can serve the interests of its voters.
The rest of Chapter 1 is organized as follows. First in Section 1 we
define “non-atomic purely-aggregative games” and prove that in this class of
games every strategy profile is Nash equilibrium. In Section 2 we define “games
of restricted participation”, “restricted strategy profiles” and “restricted dis-
tributions of strategies”. Through a number of examples we characterize the
set of implausible Nash equilibria of a non-atomic game with a continuum
of players. In Section 3 we discuss the concepts of Economic Negligibility
and Strategic Insignificance, and take on the challenge of restoring Strategic
Significance and interaction between players without negating Economic Neg-
ligibility. In Section 4 we define the “better-response preference relation over
3
strategies” and the associated equilibrium-concept that we call “limit-plausible
equilibrium”. In addition we establish two results that are particularly useful
in qualifying strategy profiles as limit-plausible equilibria, and in identifying
implausible equilibria. Then we demonstrate the extent that our results fa-
cilitate analysis of three strategic environments: voter behavior in elections
with seats, welfare maximization in a multi-period economy, and production
optimization in a Cournot market. The proofs to our propositions are included
in the appendix at the end of this chapter.
1.2 Related Literature
In the economics literature there is little discussion on the relation between
Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players, and Nash equilibria of
games with finitely many players. On the one hand, researchers have sug-
gested modifications to finite games in order to exhibit equilibrium properties
of games with a continuum of players. For example, in the class of finite
aggregative games, Alos-Ferrer and Ania (2005) define an optimal Aggregate-
Taking Strategy as the strategy that, given the aggregate value that results
when all players adopt it, is optimal for the individual. Under the assumption
of Aggregate-Taking Strategies a player chooses her strategy without taking
into account her impact on the aggregate exactly because the value of ag-
gregate can be taken for granted. Consequently, even if this player has a
non-negligible impact on the aggregate, she will behave as if her impact was
indeed negligible. This nullifies strategic interaction even when the number of
players is finite, and gives a result diametrically opposed to what we aim to
achieve.
4
On the other hand, researchers have studied extensively the conditions
under which equilibria of increasing sequences of economies are also equilibria
of the corresponding non-atomic economy. The question, however, that we
seek to address is more related to lower hemicontinuity1: we wish to restrict
the set of Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players to the equilibria
that we consider to be plausible. We achieve this on the one hand by qualifying
all plausible equilibria, and on the other hand by excluding any equilibrium
involving strategies that are not best-responses in almost any finite-player
version of the game.
Regarding lower hemicontinuity of Nash equilibrium, Khan and Sun
(1999), Al-Najjar (2008), and Carmona and Podczeck (2009) establish results
regarding approximate equilibria of games with finitely many players. They
establish an equivalence relation between exact equilibria of non-atomic games
and limiting -equilibria of finite games. An -equilibrium or “near-Nash equi-
librium”, is a strategy profile that satisfies the condition of Nash equilibrium
approximately. The Nash equilibrium condition is not satisfied exactly be-
cause at least one player has chosen her strategies assuming (correctly) that
her payoff has changed by  > 0. Our work differs from the work of Khan and
Sun (1999), Al-Najjar (2008), and Carmona and Podczeck (2009) substantially
in principle since we look at exact Nash equilibria, i.e strategy profiles that
satisfy exactly the conditions of the original Nash equilibrium concept. We
demand that these equilibrium conditions are satisfied both in the non-atomic
game with a continuum of players and in the game with finitely many players.
1A correspondence T : A→ B is said to be lower hemicontinuous at the point y if for any
open set O such that O∩T (y) 6= ∅ there exists neighborhood U of x such that O∩T (x) 6= ∅
for all x ∈ U . A correspondence T : A→ B is said to be upper hemicontinuous at the point
y if for any open neighborhood O of T(y) there exists a neighborhood U of a such that for
all x ∈ U , T (x) ⊂ O.
5
Most relevant to our objective are two working papers by Carmona
(2004), and Barlo and Carmona (2011). In both papers the authors recog-
nize that implausible Nash equilibria can exist in games with a continuum of
players, and propose Nash equilibrium refinements.
Carmona (2004) proposes a Nash equilibrium refinement based on a
limit concept. A “limit-equilibrium” of a non-atomic game with a continuum
of players is the limit of a sequence of Nash equilibria when the sequence of cor-
responding finite games converges to the non-atomic game with a continuum
of players. At first glance this approach may seem remarkably close to ours.
Nonetheless it requires the simultaneous convergence of entire Nash equilib-
rium strategy profiles. This means that each player’s strategy has to be in the
same sequence with all other players’ strategies. Our approach does not require
the convergence of whole Nash equilibrium strategy profiles, but instead, the
convergence of just singleton sequences of “most-preferred strategies”. Each
player can have her own, possibly distinct, sequence of “most-preferred strate-
gies” that converges to a Nash equilibrium of the limit-game.
Barlo and Carmona (2011) define a strategic equilibrium as the limit of
a sequence of equilibria of -perturbed games. In each perturbed game each
player believes that only her action has an  effect on the aggregate; the limit
is attained as this belief tends to zero. Nevertheless this approach is based on
the assumption that players are not rational. Barlo and Carmona admit that
“...in the -perturbed game agents are not rational, because an agent thinks
that he alone has an  impact on the societal choice, and does not foresee
that other players have the same consideration as well”. On the contrary, our
refinement preserves individual rationality by letting players choose strategies
as if they were playing a game where everyone has the same non-zero effect on
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the aggregate and this is common knowledge. The assumption of individual
rationality permeates economic analysis and game theory, and violating it
would create a number of paradoxes.
In Stergianopoulos (2008) we presented our first attempt to resolve
the issue of implausible Nash equilibria in purely-aggregative games with a
continuum of players. In the first part of that study we identified the issue
of proliferation and implausibility of Nash equilibria, and proved existence
of implausible Nash equilibria in a specific class of purely-aggregative games
with a continuum of players.2 In the second part of Stergianopoulos (2008)
we proposed an equilibrium concept, “overtaking Nash equilibrium”, based
on overtaking preferences. The “overtaking Nash equilibrium” was not con-
structed following the approach based on better-responses that we follow in
this study (see Section 1.6). As a result, in Stergianopoulos (2008) we were
able to demonstrate existence of an “overtaking Nash equilibrium” equilibrium
only in a specific subclass of purely-aggregative games where each player has
a dominant3 strategy.
Although this study shares the same point of departure and some of the
basic principles with Stergianopoulos (2008), the scope of analysis is different.
Our present study applies to a larger class of games since we need only a strict
subset of the previous assumptions.4 Second, our 2008 study possessed limited
theoretical foundations. Here we employ more sophisticated tools and we set
the theoretical underpinnings both for Stergianopoulos (2008) and for a new
2This class of games involved games with finitely many types of players and differentiable
payoff functions.
3A dominant strategy is a strategy that results in a higher payoff for the player who
employs it, irrespective of what the other players do. For example, in the classical prisoner’s
dilemma, betraying the trust of the other player is a dominant strategy for both players.
4For example, we do not require finitely many types of players or differentiable payoff
functions.
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framework for the study of games with many players.
1.3 Purely-aggregative Games
The main characteristic of purely-aggregative games is the structure of strate-
gic interdependence among players: each player’s payoff depends on her own
strategy only through “collective action” which is signified by some real-valued
function of all players’ strategies in the game. The fact that payoffs may be
determined solely by collective action has been pointed out among others by
Jensen (2008), Rath (1992), and Vives (1999). In addition, Jensen (2008) and
Rauh (1997) suggested that collective action can be modeled as a statistic,
like the mean of all players’ strategies or even a higher moment. In the class
of purely-aggregative games belong many applications of game theory that
are of substantial interest to economists: elections, environmental models of
pollution, models of managing common resources, network congestion, market
competition, public goods, and generally, all widespread externalities (Kaneko
and Wooders (1994)). In general, the class of purely-aggregative games in-
volves any strategic situation where individuals are affected predominantly by
an aggregate of the behavior of others, and where permuting the strategies of
any number of players has no effect on the payoff of the rest of the players since
its the collective action that matters, and not specifically who plays what.
1.3.1 Games with a continuum of players
Let I := [0, 1] denote the set of players where a player is a real number in that
interval, and λ denote the Lebesgue measure on I . The Lebesgue measure
is an example of a non-atomic probability measure. Such a measure does not
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admit atoms, or equivalently it requires that every set of positive measure has
a proper subset of positive measure. The related sigma-algebra is denoted by
B.
The set of actions for each player i ∈ I is denoted by A which is a
compact space, and ∆(A) denotes the set of all Borel probability measures
on A. We interpret a measure µ ∈ ∆(A) as the proportion of players whose
strategies belong to the same set, i.e.
µ(B ⊂ A) = λ({i ∈ I | αi ∈ B}
where αi is the strategy of player i.
It is worth noting that we consider exclusively single-move games. In
these games the main distinction between an action and a strategy is that a
strategy is the one action that is played.5 We will use the term “strategy”
whenever the two terms are equivalent, and make a clear distinction between
strategies and actions whenever risk of confusion arises.
Definition 1. A non-atomic game with a continuum of players denoted by
G := 〈{I,B, λ}, A, p〉
is said to be purely-aggregative if the payoff of each player depends only on
the distribution of strategies of all players. Mathematically, if for every player
i ∈ I we can express her payoff function pi, as
pi : ∆(A)→ R
5It is in multiple-move games that a strategy in conceptually different from an action.
In these games, strategies involve a list of actions played at each stage of the game.
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Note that we assume pi to be continuous and that λ is a non-atomic
probability measure and thus, any single player has zero measure.6 Sets of
zero measure do not affect the distribution and consequently the strategy of
any single player cannot affect the distribution of strategies of all players in
the game.
We believe that conceptually the Schmeidler - Mass-Colell framework
includes the class of purely aggregative games. Schmeidler (1973), on the one
hand, states that “Non-atomic games enable us to analyze a conflict situation
where the single player has no influence on the situation but the aggregative
behavior of “large” sets of players can change the payoffs”. On the other hand,
in the mathematical model each player’s payoff is a function of both her own
strategy and of the distribution of strategies of all players. One could discard
Schmeidler’s (1973) framework as inappropriate to model purely-aggregative
games with a continuum of players simply on that account. We wish to provide
an additional reason in support of the need for an alternative framework for
the study of games with infinitely-many players. That is precisely why we give
a second chance to the Schmeidler - Mass-Colell framework (or “the benefit of
the doubt”) and through Proposition 1 reveal a weakness of this framework in
the class of purely-aggregative games with a continuum of players. With the
following proposition we establish that in the aforementioned class of games
the only prediction one can make using the Nash equilibrium is that every
outcome is possible. Note that even in any finite version of the game there
6Here we provide a short proof that when players belong to a set I endowed with a
non-atomic measure λ, single players have zero weight. We claim no originality of this proof
but we do not have a reference for it. A measure λ on B is non-atomic⇔ for every B ∈ B
such that λ(B) > 0 there exists K ⊂ B such that λ(B) > λ(K) > 0. Since the only
subset of a singleton set is the empty set and λ(∅) = 0, it should be the case that λ({i}) =
0 for every i ∈ I.
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are strategies profiles that are not Nash equilibrium, in the continuum version
of the game every strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium In that sense, Nash
equilibrium is a vacuous solution concept of purely aggregative games with
a continuum of players because it does not “solve” the game in a non-trivial
way. We want to emphasize that by definition, the only way that every strategy
profile is Nash equilibrium of a game is if every strategy is a best-response.
This means that the best-response correspondence is the entire strategy set of
each player, and using Nash equilibrium we cannot make any useful prediction
of how the game will be played.
Proposition 1. In a purely-aggregative non-atomic game with a continuum
of players G every strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
A proof is provided in the Appendix.
We understand that a reader knowledgeable in game theory would could
consider the proof of Proposition 1 immediate, and indeed the proof follows
directly from the related definitions. We include Proposition 1 and its proof
for completeness and we believe that its value does not lie in establishing a
ground-breaking result. Our aim is to make available to the reader who is less
accustomed to games with infinitely many players a proof that makes clear how
the related concepts interact with each other and the exact point of departure
for our analysis in this chapter.
Note that although that Proposition 1 applies only to purely-aggregative
games, our examples of a Cournot market game and of welfare maximization
in a multi-period economy are general aggregative games. As we will see in
Section 1.5, in these examples not every strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium
of the non-atomic game with a continuum of players but many Nash equilibria
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can be considered implausible since they could not exist in any finite version
of the game.
1.3.2 Games of restricted participation
In this section we define games of restricted participation and we link games
with a continuum of players to games with a finite set of players. We consider
finite sets of players that are subsets of the given continuum set of players. A
“restricted game” is the restriction of the non-atomic game with a continuum
of players to a finite number of players. The purpose of the restricted game is
to simulate the strategic environment that would arise if participation in the
non-atomic game with a continuum of players was restricted to a finite subset
of players. Furthermore, we want to exclude from our study non-atomic games
that in their restricted games every strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. In
other words, we want to consider non-atomic games whose restricted games
have strategy profiles that are Nash equilibria, and strategy profiles that are
not Nash equilibria. This way we will have some idea of what outcome of the
game could be considered plausible based on Nash equilibrium criterion, and
what outcome could not be considered plausible.7
If we endow ∆(I) with the topology of weak convergence of measures 8,
and denote the associated Prohorov metric by dP then (∆(I), dP ) is a compact
space like I (Theorem 15.15 in Aliprantis and Border (2005)). For each natural
7Our analysis and our equilibrium concept do apply also to non-atomic games with
restricted games where every strategy profile is Nash equilibrium. Be that as it may, we
exclude these games because we believe that they are not interesting.
8A sequence {λN} of measures converges “weakly” (or “in distribution”) to λ, and we
can write λN ⇒ λ, if
lim
#N→∞
∫
I
f(i)dλN (i) =
∫
I
f(i)dλ(i)
for every continuous, bounded, real-valued function f : I → R.
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number n ∈ N, let ∆(I) ⊂ ∆(I) consist of those probability measures such
that
λN({i}) ∈ {0, 1
#N
} for each i ∈ I
Then for a set N ⊂ I we have
λN({i}) = 1
#N
if i ∈ N, and λN({i}) = 0 if i ∈ I \N
which means that player i participates in the game with #N players and has
weight 1
#N
. If player i ∈ I does not participate in that game then λN({i}) = 0.
The measure λN selects from the space of all potential players, the #N players
that actually participate in the game.
Let F(I) ⊂ 2I denote the family of all finite subsets of I.
Definition 2. Given a non-atomic game with a continuum of players G, the
restricted game with player-set N ∈ F(I) is a triple
GN := 〈{N, λN}, A, pN〉
where
λN({i}) := 1
#N
for every i ∈ N
is the uniform probability measure over #N objects. The payoff function
piN : ∆(A)→ R for i ∈ N
is the restriction of pi to the set of distributions ∆ with #N equiprobable atoms,
and is assumed to be continuous.
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Definition 3. Given a strategy profile A of a non-atomic game with a con-
tinuum of players G, the restricted strategy profile AN of the game GN
is the restriction of A to the player-set N ∈ F(I). Also, given a distribution
µ ∈ ∆(A) of strategies of all players in the non-atomic game G, the restricted
distribution of strategies µN ∈ ∆(A) of the game GN is the restriction of
µ to the player-set N ∈ F(I).
As we mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, it is important
that we consider games where the Nash equilibrium criterion excludes some
outcomes. To do this we consider restricted games where not every strategy
profile is a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 4. A restricted game GN with finitely many players is non-degenerate
if not every strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of GN . Similarly, a game
G with a continuum of players is non-degenerate if for arbitrarily large but
finite N ∈ F(I) the restricted game GN is non-degenerate.
1.4 Economic Negligibility and Strategic In-
significance
In this section we study the concept of individual negligibility in economics.
In economic theory individuals are considered to be negligible when they have
a negligible effect on aggregates, for example prices, inflation, and total pro-
duction. We make a conceptual distinction with practical consequences to our
analysis. We split the concept of individual negligibility into “economic negli-
gibility” and “strategic insignificance”. These two concepts are similar though
distinctively different but in the continuum framework these two concepts
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coincide. This coincidence constitutes a serious weakness of the continuum
framework and we demonstrate this through a number of examples. The di-
chotomy we make reveals that formulating strategic environments with many
participants as games with a continuum of players has a dual effect on the
strategic idiosyncracy of individuals. On the one hand it ensures that individ-
uals cannot manipulate aggregates, and on the other hand it robs individuals
of any strategic control over their own payoff. Most importantly, this separa-
tion guides us to formulate an equilibrium concept that remedies the weakness
of Nash equilibrium in purely-aggregative non-atomic games.
Individual economic negligibility is a fundamental property that mod-
els of perfect competition need either to possess endogenously or to assume
exogenously.
Definition 5. Economic negligibility describes the situation where no sin-
gle player can affect the value of an aggregate that affects players’ payoff and
is defined with respect to the functional form of the aggregate and the specific
strategic situation that the players participate in.
Such an aggregate can be: price, total quantity, total traffic or emis-
sions, or any kind of average of the strategies of all players. For example, in an
economy with a continuum of agents economic negligibility is endogenous since
every agent carries zero weight and thus cannot affect prices. The very mo-
ment that agents have any power over prices we cannot regard the respective
markets as perfectly competitive nor the associate models as representative of
competitive markets.9
9Khan (2008) offers a more extensive discussion of the relationship between economic
negligibility and perfect competition.
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A seemingly equivalent concept, strategic insignificance, is a conse-
quence of assuming uncountably many individuals. This is the case when
individuals are represented as elements of a set with the cardinality of the
continuum. In a wide class of games, strategic insignificance deprives players
of any control over the payoff outcome.
Definition 6. Strategic insignificance describes the situation where a player
with well-ordered preferences over outcomes is rendered indifferent between any
two of her strategies because neither strategy can affect the outcome, indepen-
dently of what the other players choose to do.
Strategic insignificance creates a situation where any strategy profile is
Nash equilibrium. Note that at Nash equilibrium players are allowed to be
indifferent between some of their strategies and this is what we call “Nash-
equilibrium indifference”. At Nash equilibrium no player should have an incen-
tive to deviate from her chosen strategy given the specific response of the other
players. Nevertheless, in games where not every strategy profile is Nash equi-
librium (non-degenerate games), this indifference cannot hold for all possible
responses of the other players; that would violate rationality.
Before we proceed to examples we should emphasize that the concepts
of economic negligibility and strategic insignificance coincide in large class
of game-theoretic models with a continuum of players. This class includes
purely-aggregative games with a continuum of players.
Basically, the two concepts will coincide in any game where both the
following two conditions hold:
a) every player’s payoff depends entirely on an aggregate such as price, total
quantity, total traffic or emissions, or any kind of average of the strategies
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of all players
b) no single player has the power to manipulate this aggregate
1.4.1 Example: Economic Negligibility without Strate-
gic Insignificance
Consider a non-atomic game with a continuum of players where each player’s
payoff depends entirely on that player’s cost of exerting effort. Each player’s
effort has zero weight in the determination of the total effort and thus each
player is economically negligible. Nonetheless, each player can affect her own
level of effort and thus her own payoff. This way players are not necessarily
indifferent between their strategies and thus not strategically insignificant.
1.4.2 Example: Strategic Insignificance without Eco-
nomic Negligibility
Typically, when players can affect aggregates then they are able to affect also
their own payoff. In games with a continuum of players, economic negligibility
holds precisely because that is the modeler’s intent. Even so, if we slightly
bend our modeling rationality and stretch our assumptions, we can construct
game-theoretic scenarios where players are strategically insignificant without
being economically negligible.
Consider a game where each player’s payoff is determined solely by an
action that some other player takes. For example, imagine a situation where
i. high noise coming from a neighbor’s house has such a detrimental effect
on a player’s wellbeing that, above a level, it fully determines her payoff
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ii. no player has control over her neighbor’s actions but she can affect (e.g.
increase) the total noise level in her neighborhood
Therefore strategic insignificance holds while economic negligibility does not.
1.5 Examples of Implausible Nash equilibria
In this section we examine some applications of game theory that are of sub-
stantial interest to economists. In each example we identify the implausible
Nash equilibria and explain in detail why we consider them to be implausible.
Then we compare the equilibrium behavior in the non-atomic game with a
continuum of players with the equilibrium behavior in an arbitrary restricted
game. In all cases the comparison of equilibrium behavior supports our choice
of implausible Nash equilibria. We look at equilibrium strategies, as opposed
to equilibrium distributions, because according to Carmona (2006) in games
with countable action space all equilibrium behavior is captured by equilibrium
strategies. It is worth noting that we do not claim that there is no plausible
Nash equilibrium of the game G with a continuum of players. We rather claim
that there exists at least one implausible Nash equilibrium of G.
A brief clarification regarding some of our notation: throughout this
study we use the letter j as a superscript to denote the strategy of a specific
player under consideration e.g. αj, βj, γj and we use the letter i in sums and
integrals i.e.
∑
i∈N q
i,
∫
i∈N q
idλ and also for players in general when we do not
single-out a specific player.
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1.5.1 Intertemporal welfare maximization
The following scenario is motivated by an example provided by Hammond
(2007). There is a two-period economy G with a single, homogeneous, and
countably divisible good, a continuum of agents endowed with a non-atomic
probability measure λ, and a “benevolent” policy-maker. In the beginning of
period 1 each agent is endowed a fixed quantity of the good. Then each agent
decides how much to save for period 2 and consumes the remainder during
period 1. In period 2 there are no decisions, just consumption of what has
been saved in period 1. The consumption of agent j ∈ I in periods 1 and 2
is denoted by cj1 and c
j
2 respectively, and her initial endowment is denoted by
ej. We assume that it is not possible for each agent to consume her entire
endowment in a single period without becoming satiated. That is, agents will
reach their maximum utility and there still be available units for consumption.
We do assume however that agents can dispose any quantity of the good at
no cost.
Each agent seeks to maximize her utility over the two periods
uj(cj1, c
j
2) := u
j(cj1) + u
j(cj2)
subject to the individual feasibility constraint
cj1 + c
j
2 ≤ ej
The policy-maker is benevolent in that she seeks to maximize a Bergson social
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welfare function of the form
U(c1, c2) :=
∫
I
ui(ci1, c
i
2)dλ
subject to individual and aggregate feasibility constraints.10 According to the
example provided by Hammond (2007), in order to achieve the intertemporal
welfare optimum, it is as if the policy-maker confiscates all savings after period
1 and redistributes them equally to all agents in period 2. Therefore each agent
j ∈ I has expected utility
uj(cj1, c
j
2) := u
j(cj1) + u
j(
∫
I
(ei − ci1)dλ)
where
∫
I(e
i − ci1)dλ) is the average saving per head available in period 2.
Note that no single agent can affect
∫
I(e
i − ci1)dλ and hence cannot
affect her utility in period 2. It is not that agents do not care about their
utility in period 2 but that there is no way for any single agent to affect it. In
this economy with the benevolent policy-maker, agents can take their utility
in period 2 as given and seek to maximize only their utility in period 1. Each
agent knows that her own savings have negligible effect on the aggregate of
the second period, and on that account period 2 is simply not relevant to her
maximization problem, and need not be considered.
In this example the set of implausible Nash equilibria includes the fol-
lowing strategy profiles:
1) The strategy profile where every agent saves nothing for period 2
10These constraints guarantee that in period 1 no individual consumes more than her
endowment, and that in period 2 total consumption equals total savings.
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2) All strategy profiles where only countably many agents save something for
period 2
In either case, this kind of behavior would lead to
∫
I(e
i − ci1)dλ = 0. This
means that we would get zero consumption in period 2. We believe that it
is reasonable to assume that zero consumption in any single period leads to
death within that period. Analogously, zero consumption overall means death
of all agents in the economy. With death being the least desirable outcome we
can safely regard zero consumption as an implausible outcome.
Now we examine an arbitrary restricted economy GN . In this economy
the expected utility of any agent j ∈ N is
uj(cj1, c
j
2) := u
j(cj1) + u
j(
1
#N
∑
i∈N
(ei − ci1))
Individual savings can affect 1
#N
∑
i∈N(e
i − ci1) since
d 1
#N
∑
i∈N(e
i − ci1)
d(ej − cj1)
=
1
#N
> 0
for every j ∈ N and on that account all agents will choose a strictly positive
level of savings for period 2.
Here we see that while the outcome of “zero consumption in period 2”
is a Nash equilibrium of the economy with a continuum of agents, it is not a
Nash equilibrium of any economy with finitely-many agents.
1.5.2 Cournot market game
Consider a Cournot market gameG = 〈I,B, A, p〉 with a continuum set of firms
I := [0, 1] endowed with a non-atomic measure λ. For a single homogeneous
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good, each firm j ∈ I decides its level of production
qj ∈ Aj := [0, qmax] ∩Q
and qmax ≥ 1− c where c ∈ [0, 1) is the unit cost of production. The function
P (Q) = 1 − Q relates the price P of the good with the average quantity
produced Q :=
∫
I q
idλ. Then the payoff function of firm j can be represented
by its profit function
pj(qj, Q) := (1−Q)qj − cqj = (1−
∫
I
qidλ− c)qj
The Nash equilibrium strategies belong to the set
{qj ∈ Aj | 1−
∫
I
qidλ− c = 0}
because only if 1 − ∫I qidλ − c = 0 does the profit of every firm equal zero
and so there is no incentive for a firm to change its current production level.
Therefore if 1 − ∫I qidλ − c = 0 then pj(qj, Q) = 0 for any qj ∈ [0, qmax ≥
1− c]∩Q and for every firm j ∈ I. Otherwise, if 1− ∫I qidλ− c 6= 0, for some
qj ∈ [0, qmax ≥ 1− c] ∩Q we have
∂pj(qj, Q)
∂qj
6= 0
and therefore there are firms that can affect their payoff and have a clear
incentive to change their production level; we are not at Nash equilibrium.
We established that at Nash equilibrium 1−∫I qidλ−c = 0 should hold
and the profits of every firm will be zero. Therefore firm j is anyway making
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zero profit, any level of production in [0, qmax] ∩ Q can be part of a Nash
equilibrium.
Now we examine an arbitrary restricted game GN . In this game the
average quantity is
Q :=
1
#N
∑
i∈N
qi
Since
∂Q
∂qj
=
1
#N
> 0
for every j ∈ N we have
∂pj(qj, Q)
∂qj
= 1− c− 1
#N
(
∑
i∈N
qi + qj) = 0
for
q∗j =
1− c
#N + 1
∈ (0, qmax] ∩Q
Consequently there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium where each
firm maximizes its profits by producing its optimal quantity q∗.
Here we see that while any qj ∈ [0, qmax] ∩Q is a Nash equilibrium of
the non-atomic market game with a continuum of players, not every qj is part
of a Nash equilibrium of a market game with finitely-many players.
1.6 Limit-plausible equilibrium
In the examples of the previous section we demonstrated that none of the im-
plausible Nash equilibria could exist in any finite version of the non-atomic
game with a continuum of players. Nevertheless, this is not due to the “finite-
ness” property per se, but due to the non-negligible impact that each player
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has on the payoff outcome. This non-negligible impact on the aggregate cre-
ates an incentive for each player to choose a strategy that increases her payoff.
Even the slightest impact of an individual’s strategy on the aggregate, suffices
to break the artificial strategic insignificance.
Now we encounter the following paradox: on the one hand, from the
point of view of models of perfect competition, it is desirable that single players
are not able to manipulate aggregate statistics e.g. demand, supply, prices.
On the other hand, from the point of view of game theory, it is desirable that
single players choose strategies as if they could affect those aggregates. This
would mean that players can interact with each other even if this happens
only via the aggregate. In this case we would have economically negligible
players that are strategically significant and do think strategically in their
interaction. Our solution to this paradox is to endow players with “better-
response overtaking preferences” over strategies. It is important to emphasize
that we do not need any individual’s strategy to actually have an impact on the
aggregate, but we do need players to behave as if their strategies have such
an impact. A real-world example that people behave as if they have some
effect on the aggregate is national elections. Many people do vote even though
in national elections any single voter is, in essence, economically negligible.
Our concept of overtaking preferences is new to the literature but has its
game-theoretic origins in Rubinstein (1979).11 Rubinstein used the overtaking
criterion to distinguish between two sequences of payoffs that have the same
limit but differ in a large finite interval. In our context the overtaking property
implies that from a finite point and beyond a strategy α is always better than
11In welfare economics the idea of the overtaking criterion is due to Hammond (1975) and
in optimal growth theory due to von Weizsa¨cker (1965).
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a strategy β. In other words, if strategy α is “better” in the overtaking sense
than strategy β then this will also hold in every game with more players. Below
we provide precise definitions of the related concepts.
Definition 7. For player j ∈ N ∈ F(I) strategy α ∈ A is a better-response
than strategy β ∈ A given the distribution of strategies µN\{j} if
pj(α, µN\{j}) ≥ pj(β, µN\{j})
With the following definition we state that choosing between two strate-
gies a player will prefer the strategy that gives her a higher payoff given what
the other players have chosen to do, or be indifferent between the two strate-
gies if they give her equal payoff (given what the other players have chosen to
do).
Definition 8. Given a restricted game GN , the better-response preference
relation over strategies of player j ∈ N is a family of binary relations
<j on A× A and indexed by ∆#N−1(A)
that satisfies the following requirements:
(1) α jN,µN\{j} β if pj(α, µN\{j}) > pj(β, µN\{j})
and this means that α <jN,µN\{j} β but not β <
j
N,µN\{j} α
(2) α ∼jN,µN\{j} β if p
j(α, µN\{j}) = pj(β, µN\{j})
and this means that α <jN,µN\{j} β and also β <
j
N,µN\{j} α
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The first requirement states that in the finite game with player-set N ,
player j will prefer strategy α over strategy β if strategy α provides her with
a higher payoff than strategy β given the distribution µN\{j} of strategies of all
other players.
The second requirement states that in the finite game with player-set N ,
player j will be indifferent between strategy α and strategy β if strategy α
provides her with the same payoff as strategy β given the distribution µN\{j}
of strategies of all other players.
Note that jN,µN\{j} is asymmetric since α 
j
N,µN\{j} β means that
pj(α, µN\{j}) > pj(β, µN\{j}) but not pj(β, µN\{j}) > pj(α, µN\{j}). Also<jN,µN\{j}
is a total order and complete on the compact space A since it is induced by a
continuous payoff function pjN .
With the following definition we declare that in a non-atomic game with
a continuum of players, given a distribution of strategies µ, a player will prefer
strategy α over strategy β if she also prefers α over β given any distribution
of strategies in a sequence {µN\{j}}#N≥m that converges to µ.
Definition 9. Given a non-atomic game with a continuum of players G, the
better-response overtaking preference relation over strategies of player
j ∈ I is a family of binary relations
<j∗ on A× A and indexed by ∆(A)
that satisfies the following requirements for α j∗,µ β and for α ∼j∗,µ β.
α j∗,µ β if there exist:
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(a) a finite number of players m
(b) an expanding sequence12 of player-sets {N}#N≥m with j ∈ N
such that for any sequence {µN\{j}}#N≥m of distributions of strategies of all
other players that converges to µ it holds that α jN,µN\{j} β
Similarly for α ∼j∗,µ β
Note that j∗,µ is asymmetric since α j∗,µ β means α jN,µN\{j} β (for
any distribution µN\{j} with #N ≥ m) but not β jN,µN\{j} α (for any distri-
bution µN\{j} with #N ≥ m) and hence not β j∗,µ α.
In summary, in the game G, player j will prefer strategy α over strategy
β if there exists a finite number of players m such that strategy α provides
her with a higher payoff than strategy β, given any distribution of strategies
µN\{j} with player-set N , in any sequence {µN\{j}}#N≥m that converges to
µ. Similarly, in the game G, player j will be indifferent between strategy α
and strategy β if there exists a finite number of players m such that strategy
α provides her with the same payoff as strategy β, given any distribution of
strategies µN\{j} with with player-set N , in any sequence {µN\{j}}#N≥m that
converges to µ.
Definition 10. For a player j ∈ I a most-preferred strategy, given a
distribution of strategies µ, is a strategy α such that α <j∗,µ β for every β ∈ A.
Note that j∗,µ is not a total order and therefore existence of a “most-
preferred strategy” cannot be guaranteed.
12By “expanding sequence” we mean that each player-set is included in the next player-set
in the sequence i.e. Nk ⊂ Nk+1 for every k ∈ N
27
Definition 11. A strategy profile A is said to be a limit-plausible equilib-
rium of G if every player chooses a most-preferred strategy.
Note that the limit-plausible equilibrium is indeed a refinement of the
Nash equilibrium in purely-aggregative games with a continuum of players
since we have shown that every strategy profile of G is a Nash equilibrium of
G.
Here we provide a generic example of a purely-aggregative game in
which a most-preferred strategy does not exist for at least one player, and
therefore, a limit-plausible equilibrium does not exist.
Consider a non-atomic game with a continuum of playersG = 〈(I,B, λ), A, p〉
where each player j ∈ I chooses a rational number αj ∈ Q =: A as her strat-
egy, and her payoff is a function exclusively of the average α¯ of the strategies
of all players in the game (or equivalently the distribution of strategies of all
players µ). We assume that not all players have same payoff functions.
In the restricted game GN = 〈(N, λ), A, pN〉 assume that for player
j strategy αj is a better-response than strategy βj given the average of the
strategies of all other players α¯N\{j} (or equivalently the distribution of strate-
gies of all other players µN\{j}). Also, without loss of generality, assume that
αj > βj (since all strategies in this game can be numerically compared because
they are numbers).
As the number of players increases and more players enter the game, a
new average α¯M\{j} with N ⊂ M will be determined (and equivalently a new
distribution of strategies of all other players µM\{j}). For player j, strategy αj
will be a better-response than strategy βj given the new average α¯M\{j} only
if the new players choose strategies in a specific way that results to an average
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that still is smaller than the average that maximizes her payoff.
Therefore, along most sequences of distributions of strategies {µN\{j}}#N≥m,
what is a better-response strategy for player j will change at least once and
the better-response overtaking preference relation is not well-defined. We see
that in this example, a most-preferred strategy does not exist for at least one
player (player j), and therefore, a limit-plausible equilibrium does not exist.
Even though a limit-plausible equilibrium may not always exist, in Sec-
tion 1.7 we study examples of three important strategic environments where
a limit-plausible equilibrium does exist.
Definition 12. A strategy is µ-dominant if it provides at least as high
payoff to player j as any other strategy given µN\{j} and for any sequence
{µN\{j}}#N≥m of distributions of strategies of all other players that converges
to µ.
Note that a µ-dominant strategy is not necessarily a “dominant strat-
egy”. This is because a µ-dominant strategy provides to j at least as high
payoff as any other strategy, only for µN\{j} or for sequences {µN\{j}}#N≥m
that converge to µ, but not for any distribution of strategies of all other play-
ers. On the contrary, a dominant strategy is necessarily a µ-dominant strategy
since it provides to j higher payoff than any other strategy, given any distri-
bution of strategies of the other players.
With the following proposition we establish that the limit-plausible
equilibrium qualifies “µ-dominant” strategies (as well as “dominant” strategies
in the corollary).
Proposition 2. Let G be a purely-aggregative non-atomic game with a contin-
uum of players, such that in an arbitrarily large restricted game GN , for player
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j ∈ N there exists a µ-dominant strategy αj. Then in a limit-plausible equi-
librium of G (with induced distribution of strategies µ) player j will choose
strategy αj (or an equivalent strategy).
A proof is provided in the Appendix.
Corollary 1. Let G be a purely-aggregative non-atomic game with a contin-
uum of players, such that in an arbitrarily large restricted game GN , for player
j ∈ N there exists a dominant strategy αj. Then in a limit-plausible equi-
librium of G (with induced distribution of strategies µ) player j will choose
strategy αj (or an equivalent strategy).
Definition 13. A strategy βj is αjµ-dominated if it provides lower payoff to
player j than the strategy αj given µN\{j} and for any sequence {µN\{j}}#N≥m
of distributions of strategies of all other players that converges to µ.
Note that an αjµ-dominated strategy is not necessarily a “dominated
strategy”.13 This happens for two reasons: first because an αjµ-dominated
strategy is not dominated in given any distribution of strategies of all other
players, but only given the given µN\{j} and for any sequence {µN\{j}}#N≥m
of distributions of strategies of all other players that converges to µ. On the
contrary, a dominated strategy is necessarily an αjµ-dominated strategy since
it is dominated given any distribution of strategies of the other players.
With the following proposition we establish that the limit-plausible
equilibrium does not qualify “αjµ-dominated” strategies (as well as any “dom-
inated” strategy in the corollary).
13A “dominated” strategy should not to be confused with a “dominant” strategy. If
strategy βj is dominated by the strategy αj , then βj provides to player j lower payoff than
αj , irrespective of what the other players do.
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Proposition 3. Let G be a purely-aggregative non-atomic game with a contin-
uum of players. A limit-plausible equilibrium of G (with induced distribution of
strategies µ) cannot involve strategies that are αjµ-dominated for some player
j ∈ I.
A proof is provided in the Appendix.
Corollary 2. Let G be a purely-aggregative non-atomic game with a contin-
uum of players. A limit-plausible equilibrium of G (with induced distribution
of strategies µ) cannot involve strategies that are dominated for some player
j ∈ I.
A fundamental property of our equilibrium concept is that the strategy
profiles that it qualifies as reasonable outcomes of a non-atomic game with a
continuum of players, are also in some sense reasonable outcomes of large finite
games. This property is established with Proposition 2, Proposition 3, and
their corollaries, and they provide two convenient ways of checking whether
or not a given strategy profile is a limit-plausible equilibrium. Proposition
2 will prove useful in qualifying a strategy profile as being the unique limit-
plausible equilibrium of a non-atomic game with a continuum of players G, and
Proposition 3 will prove useful in disqualifying a strategy profile from being
limit-plausible equilibrium of G.
1.7 Examples - Continued
In this section we continue studying the examples of Section 1.5 including
the aforementioned voting game with seats. In each example, we will use the
propositions and corollaries of the previous section to justify our prediction
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of how the game will be played. This way we make clear the extent that our
results facilitate the analysis of games with a continuum of players.
1.7.1 Voting game with seats
In this voting game there is a continuum of voters and a finite number of
parties which are allocated a finite number of parliamentary seats depending
on the number of votes that they receive. We assume that the more seats a
party occupies the better it can serve the interests of those who voted for it.
We have shown that in this non-atomic game with a continuum of voters
any voting pattern is a Nash equilibrium. The paradox is that while any
single voter is not indifferent with respect to the outcome of the elections,
she nevertheless is indifferent between any two of her own strategies, and this
holds independently of what the other voters do. The unique equilibrium that
we singled out as plausible is the one where every player votes for her most-
preferable party. In light of the results of the previous section, we can now
further substantiate these statements.
Consider an allegedly implausible equilibrium of this game. In such an
equilibrium there exists at least one player in [0, 1] say player j, who votes
for a party that is not her most-preferred one. This strategy is not a best-
response in the restricted game GN because “voting for the most-preferred
party” always results in a higher payoff for player j ∈ N .14 Therefore, this
strategy is dominated in the restricted game GN and in any restricted game.
According to Proposition 3 any strategy that involves not voting for that
player’s most-preferred party cannot be part of any limit-plausible equilibrium
14Remember that for a party more votes means at least as many seats and more seats
means more effective representation of the interests of the voters for that party.
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of G.
On the other hand, for player j ∈ N the strategy “voting for the most-
preferable party” is a best-response in any restricted game GN and, as such,
a µ-dominant strategy. According to Proposition 2 in a limit-plausible equi-
librium of G every player votes for her most-preferable party.
1.7.2 Intertemporal welfare maximization
In this example we consider a two-period economy G with a single homoge-
neous good and a continuum of agents. In period 1 each agent decides how
much of her endowment to save for period 2, and consumes the remainder. In
period 2 due to the decisions of a benevolent policy-maker, agents make no
decision and each of them consumes the average of the total savings of period
1. Previously we demonstrated that in this economy implausible equilibria
arise because agents can take their utility in period 2 as given, and seek to
maximize only their utility for period 1. It is not that agents do not care about
their utility in period 2, but that there is no way for any single agent to affect
it.
We have shown that in any restricted economy GN the expected utility
of any agent j ∈ N is
uj(cj1, c
j
2) := u
j(cj1) + u
j(
1
#N
∑
i∈N
(ei − ci1))
For any finite N individual savings can affect 1
#N
∑
i∈N(e
i − ci1) and so, any
strategy that maximizes the two-period uj will involve strictly positive level of
savings. Thus, the strategy “save nothing” is dominated by the strategy “save
something”. This is because we assume that no player can consume all her
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endowment in period 1 without becoming satiated. Consequently the agents
face the dilemma of saving for period 2 or throwing away units of good. This
dominance holds for any finite number of players and for any distribution of
strategies of the other players. According to Proposition 3, strategy profiles
where even one player saves nothing for period 2 can not be part of a limit-
plausible equilibrium. Therefore in any limit-plausible equilibrium of G every
player will save a strictly positive amount.
1.7.3 Cournot market game
This example involves a Cournot market game G = 〈(I,B, λ), A, p〉 with set
of firms I := [0, 1] where each firm j ∈ I decides its level of production of a
single homogeneous good qj ∈ Aj := [0, qmax ≥ 1− c] ∩Q with c ∈ [0, 1) unit
cost of production and seeks to maximize its profit function
pj(qj, Q) := (1−Q)qj − cqj = (1−
∫
I
qidλ− c)qj
Given any finite set of firms N we have shown that firm j has an incentive to
produce qj
∗
:= 1−c
N+1
. This incentive exists for any production level of the other
firms in the market. Therefore for firm j any strategy qj ∈ [0, qmax]∩Q\{qj∗}
is dominated by the strategy qj
∗
. According to Proposition 3 any strategy
qj ∈ [0, qmax] ∩ Q \ {qj∗} cannot be part of a limit-plausible equilibrium of
G. The unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the restricted game GN that
we singled out is {qj = qj∗ for every j ∈ N} and the strategy of producing
qj
∗
:= 1−c
N+1
remains a best-response, irrespective of the production level of the
other firms. According to Corollary 1 the limit-plausible equilibrium of G that
consists of the strategies qj
∗
.
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1.8 Concluding Remarks
We have identified a weakness in Nash equilibrium in a large class of games
with a continuum of players. This weakness is of both conceptual and technical
importance and raises issues that have not been adequately addressed in the
literature.
The conceptual aspect of the problem involves the suggestion that in the
non-atomic game with a continuum of players, players may choose strategies
that they would not choose in any finite version of the game. This calls
into question the relationship between games with a continuum of players and
games with finitely many players, and whether games with a continuum of
players are a suitable limit-abstraction of large finite games.
Through a number of examples we demonstrated two important side-
effects of assuming a continuum of players. First, assuming a continuum of
players breaks the link between strategies and outcomes. Since no single player
can affect the outcome of the game, players become indifferent among their
strategies while they are not indifferent among outcomes of the game.
The second side effect is that any strategic interaction among players
is completely muted, and the strategy of any single player has no effect on
any other player. Note that by construction the payoff of each player depends
predominantly on the distribution of strategies of all players, and permuting
the strategies of two players does not affect the payoff of the other players.
Nonetheless, the fact that a specific strategy has been played should impact
the payoff of the other players even if this impact is independent of the identity
of the player who chose the strategy. Zero strategic interaction is a particularly
striking side-effect since strategic interaction is the essence of game theory and
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cornerstone of Nash equilibrium.
The technical aspect of the problem involves the proliferation of Nash
equilibria. In most cases infinitely many strategy profiles are qualified as Nash
equilibria, and in many cases any strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium! This
way the solution concept of Nash equilibrium fails its purpose and does not
help predict the outcome of the game.
The weakness that we uncovered and the transpiring problems that we
established have two main parts: a game and a solution concept. In this chap-
ter we focused on the solution concept. We proposed as a solution concept of
aggregative non-atomic games the “limit-plausible equilibrium”, a refinement
of Nash equilibrium. To construct our equilibrium concept, first we had to de-
fine a new preference relation over strategies. We said that, in the non-atomic
game with a continuum of players, it is reasonable to expect players to choose
strategies that they would consistently choose in large but finite versions of
the game. We demonstrated in a number of strategic situations how our our
equilibrium concept rules-out implausible strategy profiles but keeps the Nash
equilibria that could exist in large finite-player versions of the game.
There is no consensus in the literature on whether a non-atomic game
with a continuum of players is the proper way to conceptualize strategic situa-
tions with infinitely many players. Nevertheless, there is no definite alternative
to the existing Schmeidler - Mas-Colell framework. In Chapter 2 of this study
we take on the challenge of setting sound foundations for a new approach to
formulating strategic models with infinitely many participants. This involves
a new definition of the space of players and a new definition of the correspond-
ing games. In addition, we develop a series of tools that we hope will serve as
a launching platform and guide for a more consistent framework for the study
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of games with many players.
1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In a purely-aggregative non-atomic game with a continuum of players G every
strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By definition, in a purely-aggregative game G the payoff of each player
i ∈ I can be written as pi : ∆(A) → R which means that it depends only on
the distribution of strategies of all players. In addition, G is a non-atomic
game with a continuum of players endowed with a non-atomic measure and
consequently a single player cannot affect the distribution of strategies of all
players.15 Combining the above two statements we conclude that the action
of any single player does not affect her own payoff. Consequently, for a single
arbitrary player, every strategy, given the distribution of strategies of all other
players, leads to no greater or smaller payoff than any other strategy. Hence
every strategy is a best-response for that player. Since the above player is
arbitrary, the result holds for all players in the game. We see that any strategy
profile of G consists of strategies that are best-responses, and as such, any
strategy profile of G is also a Nash equilibrium of G.
15For completeness, at this point we revisit the short proof that single players have zero
weight in the determination of the value of a non-atomic measure. A measure λ on B is
non-atomic ⇔ for every B ∈ B such that λ(B) > 0 there exists K ⊂ B such that
λ(B) > λ(K) > 0. Since the only subset of a singleton set {i} is the empty set and
λ(∅) = 0, it should be the case that λ({i}) = 0 for every i ∈ B.
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1.9.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let G be a purely-aggregative non-atomic game with a continuum of players,
such that in an arbitrarily large restricted game GN , for player j ∈ N there
exists a µ-dominant strategy αj. Then in a limit-plausible equilibrium of G
(with induced distribution of strategies µ) player j will choose strategy αj (or
an equivalent strategy).
Proof. Assume that G := 〈(I,B, λ), A, p〉 is as described above and in some
restricted game GN , for player j ∈ N there exists a µ-dominant strategy αj.
This means that given the distribution of strategies µN\{j} with j ∈ N and
also given any sequence {µN\{j}}#N≥m that converges to µ we have
pj(αj, µN\{j}) ≥ pj(βj, µN) ∀βj ∈ A and so αj <jN,µN\{j} βj ∀βj ∈ A
Therefore, there exists a finite m ≥ #N such that given any sequence of
distributions of strategies {µN\{j}}#N≥m that converges to µ we have αj <jN,µN\{j}
βj and this holds for every βj ∈ A. This means that strategy αj is a most-
preferred strategy for player j and, by definition of a limit-plausible equi-
librium, player j will choose her µ-dominant strategy αj or an equivalent
strategy.
1.9.3 Proof of Proposition 3
A limit-plausible equilibrium of a purely-aggregative non-atomic game with a
continuum of players G (with induced distribution of strategies µ) cannot in-
volve strategies that are αjµ-dominated for some player j ∈ I.
Proof. Assume that βj is a αjµ-dominated strategy for some player j ∈ N . This
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means that given µN\{j} with j ∈ N and also given any sequence {µN\{j}}#N≥m
that converges to µ we have
pj(αj, µN\{j}) > pj(βj, µN\{j}) and so αj jN,µN\{j} βj
Hence for any sequence {µN\{j}}#N≥m that converges to µ strategy αj is
preferred by player j over strategy βj. Therefore, in the non-atomic game with
a continuum of players G, player j would never prefer βj over αj. It follows
that the αjµ-dominated strategy β
j cannot be a most-preferred strategy and
not a part of any limit-plausible equilibrium of G.
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Chapter 2
Complete Spaces of Games
2.1 Introduction
In the first chapter of this study we identified a weakness of the Schmeidler -
Mas-Colell framework and developed a potential remedy: the limit-plausible
equilibrium, a new refinement of Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, the weakness
we identified seems to extend beyond the specific equilibrium concept (Nash
equilibrium) and to be intrinsic to the Schmeidler - Mas-Colell framework.
Our aim is to provide sound theoretical foundations and a set of tools for an
alternative framework for the study of large games. We build our foundations
using familiar mathematical concepts like sequences, limits, and distributions.
We study normal-form games with countably-many1 players and anony-
mous interaction. Normal-form is the most convenient representation of games
of complete and perfect information where players move simultaneously and
only once, which is exactly our type of game.
A limiting-game with infinitely many players is a limit abstraction that
1Our definition of a “countable set” includes also every finite set.
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should facilitate the study of strategic situations with finitely-many partici-
pants since we live in a world with finitely many inhabitants. In addition,
there is a discontinuity in moving from countably-many to uncountably-many
players and this can give rise to problems some of which we studied in Chapter
1 where we considered a continuum of players. We believe that countability of
the participants of most strategic situations is to some degree a natural prop-
erty and a reasonable assumption. Therefore, we study games that involve
countably-many players, as opposed to uncountably-many.
The interaction among players is anonymous in the sense that the payoff
of each player depends on her action and on the distribution of strategies of all
players, and permuting the strategies of two players does not affect the payoff
of the other players.
Our methodology is straightforward: first we provide a new definition
of a game; a definition that allows us to compare games with different number
of players. Then we define a way to measure the distance between two games
and this, in turn, allows us to define convergence of a sequence of games. Then
we characterize a complete family of games with the following property: every
game that involves all potential players is the limit of a sequence of games
as the number of players increases, and every expanding sequence of games
has a unique limit-game that involves all potential players. This property
fosters an equivalence relation between equilibrium behavior in games with
infinitely-many players and equilibrium behavior in games with finitely-many
players.
In particular, in Section 2 we define a player-set in distributional form
which consists of a probability measure on the space of players. This prob-
ability measure singles-out from the entire player-space, the players that are
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included in the specific player-set. It does so by assigning non-zero weight
to the players in the game and zero weight to other players. We define se-
quences of player-sets in Section 3, and in Section 4 we construct a metric
space of player-sets in distributional form, and show that this metric space is
complete. We discuss in detail the importance of this result.
Next, in Section 5 we define a game in distributional form which is
a game with a player-set in distributional form. We distinguish between an
“unrestricted game” and a “restricted game”. In an unrestricted game all
potential players participate and it involves the entire player-space. On the
contrary, in a restricted game participation is restricted to some players and
it involves a subset of the player-space. We explain how, given a player-set in
distributional form, an unrestricted game generates a restricted game.
In Section 6 we define sequences of games and also discuss equivalence
classes of games in distributional form. In Section 7 we define the “better-
response preference relation of a player” which is the ranking of strategies of a
player given the strategies of the other players. This allows us to define a notion
of distance between games and convergence of a sequence of games. Then we
define a “limiting-game” which is an unrestricted game that is the limit of a
sequence of restricted games as the number of players increases. In Section 8 we
define a metric over all restricted games generated by the same limiting-game.
We show that the metric space of all games generated by the same limiting-
game is complete. In Section 9 we define the “best-response correspondence”
of a game and establish that the related metric space of games is complete
(Proposition 6). Then, in Section 10 we discuss important properties of a
complete space of games regarding strategic dominance and Nash equilibrium.
Finally, Section 11 concludes the chapter and the appendix includes the proofs
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to our propositions.
It is worth noting that we built our theoretical foundations virtually
from scratch without depending on existing economics literature. The very
reason that we start from scratch is that the Schmeidler - Mas-Colell frame-
work is the only well-received approach (for the study of games with infinitely
many players) in the economics and game theory literature. There are three
other approaches that are mathematically elegant but have been used, at best,
only by a handful of economists. We believe that one reason for this is that
these approaches require that the reader has a working knowledge of either
non-standard analysis, advanced set theory, or stochastic control. Khan and
Sun (1999) use hyperfinite Loeb spaces, Al-Najjar (2008) uses finitely-additive
measures and ultrafilters, and Lasry, Lions, and Guant (2011) use stochastic
partial differential equations. Our basic tools are mathematical concepts such
as sequences, limits, metric spaces, and distributions. Therefore, readers with
basic knowledge of topology and measure theory should be able to follow the
construction of our tools, and assess their usefulness in studying large games.
2.2 The players’ space
Let I denote the space of potential players, a countably-infinite, closed, and
metrizable set. In our case I is a compact metrizable space by the Heine-
Borel Theorem (Aliprantis and Border (2005)) since it is closed, bounded, and
metrizable. Let ∆(I) denote the set of all Borel probability measures on I
endowed with the weak-convergence topology, and d∆(I) denote the associ-
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ated Prohorov metric.2 Then ∆(I) is a compact space like I (Theorem 15.11
Aliprantis and Border (2005)).
For each set N ⊂ I we define a Borel probability measure λN ∈ ∆(I)
that satisfies the following:
1. the support3 of λN consists of #N atoms (the players),
2. λN({i}) ∈ (0, 1] for each i ∈ N ,
3. λN({i} /∈ N) = 0 and λN(N) = 1.
Note that while in our examples we consider equiprobable probability
measures, our analytical approach applies equally to non-equiprobable mea-
sures. The support of an equiprobable probability measure λN consists of #N
equiprobable atoms and, in addition to the above, λN must satisfy:
λN({i}) ∈ {0, 1
#N
} for each i ∈ I
This means that if i is one of the #N equiprobable atoms of N then
λN({i}) = 1
#N
and 0 otherwise.
In the following definition we make precise the notion of a player-set in
distributional form. Typically, a player-set contains the labels of the players
that participate in a game. Two different player-sets may involve not only
2The Prohorov metric on a space I with σ-algebra B(I) is
ρ(µ, ν) := inf

{ > 0 | ∀E ∈ B(I)|ν(E) ≤ µ(N(E)) +  and µ(E) ≤ ν(N(E)) + }
where N(E) denotes the ball of radius  around E, and µ, ν ∈ ∆(I).
3Given any measure , the support of λ is defined as the smallest closed set S ⊂ I such that
λ(S) = 1. Since I is a compact metrizable space the support of λ always exists (Chapter II
Parthasarathy (1967) and Theorem 12.14 Aliprantis and Border (2005)).
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different players but also different number of players. The distributional form
maps each player-set to a probability measure whose support consists of that
specific player-set. This way the distributional form provides a convenient and
straightforward way of comparing player-sets of different size and contents.
Definition 14. The distributional form of a player-set N ⊂ I consists
of a probability measure λN ∈ ∆(I) whose support is the player-set N . The
weight of player i ∈ I is a positive number less than 1 if i ∈ N and 0 if i /∈ N .
2.2.1 Example: Sets of firms
Consider the following set of firms in a market game
I := {1, 1
2
, ...,
m
n
, ... | m < n and m,n ∈ N} ∪ {0}
Then the distributional form of the finite set of firms
B := {1, 1
2
, ...,
9
10
} ⊂ I
is λB such that:
λB({1}) = λB({ 9
10
}) = λB({m
n
| 0 < m < n ≤ 10 and m,n ∈ N}) = 1
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and 0 otherwise.
Consider a different finite set of firms
K := {1, 1
4
,
1
9
, ...,
mm
nn
, ...
99
1010
| 0 < m < n ≤ 10 and m,n ∈ N} ⊂ I
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The distributional form of K is λK) such that
λK({1}) = λK({m
m
nn
| 0 < m < n ≤ 10 and m,n ∈ N}) = 1
33
and 0 otherwise. Note that B 6⊂ K since 1
2
belongs to B but not to K. Also
K 6⊂ B, 99
1010
belongs to K but not to B.
We can proceed to compare the two sets and see the advantages of the
distributional form. The original sets B and K have not equal cardinality, and
also have different contents i.e. different players. On the contrary, λB and λK
are probability measures defined on I and, as a result, comparison is possible.
2.3 Sequences of player-sets
Our approach is based on limits as the number of players increases, and there-
fore it is necessary before we define sequences of games, that we first define
sequences of player-sets. In this section we define the conditions that guaran-
tee that certain sequences of player-sets, we call them “admissible sequences”,
simulate more accurately the strategic environments that we want to study.
These sequences are “expanding” and “exhaustive”; they add players to the
game without excluding any of the current players, and eventually include
all potential players. These are important properties since when we define a
limit-game, we want it to be the limit of admissible sequences and to involve
all players, a necessary requirement for uniqueness of that limit-game.
The rationale behind the admissibility requirement on sequences of
games is the following:
(a) Expanding: We study the strategic behavior of players as the number of
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participants in the game increases. Therefore we are adding players to the
existing players of a game.
(b) Exhausting: We want to add players to an existing strategic situation
without systematically excluding players. We want eventually all players
to participate in the game.
Definition 15. A sequence of player-sets {Ni}∞i=1 is admissible and we can
write Ni ↑ I, if it is expanding and eventually involves all potential players.
Thus, we require that {Ni}∞i=1 converges to I from below i.e.
Ni ⊂ Ni+1 for every i, and
∞⋃
i=1
Ni = I
2.3.1 Example: Admissible sequences of firm-sets
An example of an expanding sequence of firm-sets is
{Bi}∞i<j=2 where Bi := {1,
1
2
, ...,
i
j
| i < j and i, j ∈ N}
Another example of an expanding sequence of firm-sets is
{Zk}∞k=2 where Zk :=
⋃
i<j=1,...,k
Wj
and
Wj := {1, 1
4
, ...,
ii
jj
| i < j and i, j ∈ N}
While both sequences are expanding only {Bi} is admissible. Bi ↑ I, but since
for example 1
2
6∈ Z∞, Zk does not converge to I and is not admissible.
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2.3.2 Admissible sequences of player-sets in distribu-
tional form
Definition 16. A sequence of player-sets in distributional form {(λNi)}∞i=1 is
admissible if it is generated by an admissible sequence of player-sets {Ni}∞i=1.
In the coming sections we construct various metric spaces and we con-
sider exclusively admissible sequences.
2.4 A metric space of player-sets in distribu-
tional form
In this section we define the distance between two player-sets in distributional
form and construct a complete metric space of player-sets. In this complete
metric space every player-set of infinitely-many players is the limit of an ex-
panding sequence of countable player-sets. Equivalently, every expanding se-
quence of player-sets has a unique limit-set, up to an equivalence class, that
involves all potential players.
Proposition 4. The metric space (∆(I), d∆(I)) of player-sets in distributional
form is a complete metric space.
A proof is provided in the Appendix.
2.4.1 Example: A metric space of firms
As previously d∆(I) denotes the Prohorov metric on ∆(I).
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Consider the following two player-sets in distributional form λB such that
λB({1}) = λB({1
2
}) = λB({m
n
| 0 < m < n ≤ 10 and m,n ∈ N}) = 1
34
and 0 otherwise, and λK such that
λK({m
m
nn
| 0 < m < n ≤ 10 and m,n ∈ N}) = 1
33
and 0 otherwise.
Then the distance between these two player-sets in distributional form is equal
to the corresponding value of the Prohorov metric.
We understand that calculating the value of the Prohorov metric can
be a challenging task. As we will explain later, a researcher does not have to
deal with this numerical calculation in order to use our tools and results.
2.5 Games in distributional form
Let (A, dA) denote a non-empty compact metric space of actions, ∆(A) de-
note the set of Borel probability measures on A equipped with the topology
of weak convergence, and d∆(A) denote the Prohorov metric on ∆(A). Then
(∆(A), d∆(A)) is a compact metric space (Theorem 6.4, Chapter II Parthasarathy
(1967)).
Definition 17. A non-cooperative game in distributional form is a triple
GN := 〈λN , A, pN〉
consisting of a player-set λN in distributional form, an action space A, and a
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family of continuous payoff functions
piN : A×∆(A)→ R for each i ∈ N
2.5.1 Example: Cournot market game in distributional
form
Consider the following Cournot market game GB = 〈λB, A, pB〉 with
λB({m
n
| 0 < m < n ≤ 10 and m,n ∈ N}) = 1
34
and 0 otherwise.
Each firm j ∈ B chooses a level of production of a single homogenous good
qj ∈ Aj ⊆ A := [0, qmax] ∩Q
and faces c ∈ [0, 1) unit cost of production. Assume that P (Q) = 1−Q relates
the price P of the good with the average quantity available Q := 1
34
∑
i∈B q
i.
Then the payoff function of firm j is its profit function
pj(qj,
1
34
∑
i∈B
qi; c) := (1− 1
34
∑
i∈B
qi − c)qj
We see that all parameters of the game: player-set, action space, and
payoff functions, are defined and consequently the Cournot market game GB
is well-defined.
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2.5.2 Unrestricted games and games of restricted par-
ticipation in distributional form
Definition 18. A non-cooperative unrestricted game in distributional form
is a triple
GI := 〈(λ), A, p〉
where λ ∈ ∆(I) is a probability measure on I, A is a space of actions, and p
is a family of continuous payoff functions
pi : A×∆(A)→ R for each i ∈ I
Definition 19. Given an unrestricted game GI in distributional form, the
restricted game in distributional form with player-set N ⊂ I is denoted by
GN := 〈λN , A, pN〉
consisting of a player-set in distributional form λN , an action space A, and a
family pN of continuous payoff functions
piN : A×∆(A)→ R for each i ∈ N
being the restriction of the original family of payoffs functions p to the player-
set N .
The purpose of the restricted game is to simulate the strategic environment
that would arise if participation in the game was restricted to a subset of
players.
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2.5.3 Example: Restricted Cournot market games
An example of an unrestricted game Cournot market game is GI = 〈λ,A, p〉
where the action space A is the same as in the previous example, and the
payoff function of a firm j ∈ I is
pj(qj,
∫
I
qidλ; c) := (1−
∫
I
qidλ− c)qj
A restricted Cournot market game is
GB = 〈λB, A, pB〉
with
λB({m
n
| 0 < m < n ≤ 10 and m,n ∈ N}) = 1
34
and 0 otherwise. The action space is the same, and the payoff function of a
firm j ∈ B is
pjB(q
j,
1
34
∑
i∈B
qi; c) := (1− 1
34
∑
i∈B
qi − c)qj
Another restricted game of the Cournot market game is
GK = 〈λK , A, pK〉
with
λK({m
m
nn
| 0 < m < n ≤ 10 and m,n ∈ N}) = 1
33
and 0 otherwise. The action space is the same, and the payoff function of a
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firm j ∈ K is
pjK(q
j,
1
33
∑
i∈K
qi; c) := (1− 1
33
∑
i∈K
qi − c)qj
2.6 Sequences of games
Consider the family of all sequences {Ni}∞i=1 of expanding player-sets Ni ⊆
Ni+1 ⊂ I. Such a sequence of player-sets induces a sequence of games {GNi}∞i=1
with increasing number of players and where all players of GNi participate also
in every game GNi+j further in the sequence. We will consider sequences of
games that in addition to the above, at the limit exhaust the player-space and
involve all players.
Definition 20. A sequence of games with countably many players {GN}#N≥2
is admissible, and we can write GN ↑ GI, if it is generated by an admissible
sequence of player-sets {Ni}∞i=1.
2.6.1 Example: Sequences of Cournot market games
In our example of Cournot market game the set of firms is
I := {1, 1
2
, ...,
m
n
, ... | m < n and m,n ∈ N} ∪ {0}
In the example in Section 2.3.1 of player-sets the sequence {Bi} is expand-
ing and converges to I, while {Zk} may be expanding but does not converge
to I. Thus the sequence of games induced by {Bi} is admissible and is de-
noted by {GBi}∞i=1 while {Zk} is non-admissible and on that account also the
corresponding sequence of games {GZk} is not admissible.
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2.6.2 Equivalence of games
In order to construct a complete metric space of games where every convergent
sequence of games has a unique limit (which is an unrestricted game) up to an
equivalence class, we first need to define when two games are considered to be
equivalent. In our case an equivalence class is the set of all game-sequences that
are considered to be equivalent because they converge to the same unrestricted
game.
Our notion of equivalence is based on the observation that in a game
strictly increasing affine transformations of the payoffs do not change a player’s
preference ranking over strategies. This is related to the fact that cardinal util-
ity functions are unique only up to strictly increasing affine transformations.
Definition 21. Two payoff functions
pi : A×∆(A)→ R
and
p˜i : A˜×∆(A˜)→ R
are equivalent and write pi ∼ p˜i if there exist scalars θi > 0 and φi such that
pi = θip˜i + φi
Definition 22. Two games GN := 〈λN , A, pN〉 and G˜N := 〈λ˜N , A˜, p˜N〉 are
equivalent and we write GN ∼ G˜N if for every i ⊂ N there exist scalars θi
and φi such that pi ∼ p˜i.
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2.6.3 Example: Equivalent Cournot market games
Consider our aforementioned unrestricted game Cournot market game GI =
〈λ,A, p〉 where the function P (Q) = 1 − Q relates the price P of a single
homogeneous good with the average quantity available Q :=
∫
I q
idλ, and the
per unit cost is c > 0 for i ∈ I. In addition, consider also the unrestricted game
Cournot market game G˜ = 〈λ,A, p˜〉 where the relation of the price P˜ of the
good with the average quantity available is determined by P˜ (Q) = θ(1 − Q),
and the per unit cost is now θc > 0 for i ∈ I with θ a positive real number.
In any restricted game GN the payoff function is of the form
pjN(q
j,
1
#N
∑
i∈N
qi; c) := (1− 1
#N
∑
i∈N
qi − c)qj
On the other hand, in any restricted game G˜N the payoff function is of the
form
p˜jN(q
j,
1
#N
∑
i∈N
qi; θc) := θ(1− 1
#N
∑
i∈N
qi − c)qj = θpjN
and therefore pjN ∼ p˜jN . Since this holds for every j ∈ I, we have G ∼ G˜ and
the two unrestricted games are equivalent.
In the following sections we consider exclusively player-sets and games
in distributional form and we will refer to them simply as “player-sets” and
“games”; we will restore the full title if ambiguity is likely.
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2.7 Better-Response preference relation and
correspondence
2.7.1 The graph of the Better-Response preference re-
lation of a player
In this section we define the “better-response preference relation” of a player.
This preference relation is basically a player’s ranking of her strategies, given
a distribution of strategies of all other players. The better-response preference
relation is a set whose elements are the outcomes of the following process:
compare any two strategies of a player given the distribution of strategies of
all other players, and choose the strategy that provides a higher payoff to that
player. If two strategies provide equal payoff given the specific distribution of
strategies of all other players, then they are considered to be “equivalent”. The
better-response preference relation is closely related to the Nash equilibrium
concept since it is a preference relation based on a comparison of payoffs given
what the other players have chosen to do.
Note that a better-response strategy is not necessarily a dominant strat-
egy. This happens for two reasons:
(1) a better-response strategy provides to a player at least as high payoff as
the specific strategy that is compared to, and not higher payoff than any
other strategy
(2) a better-response strategy provides to a player at least as high payoff as
a strategy that is compared to, given a specific distribution of strategies
of all other players, and not for any distribution of strategies of all other
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players
On the contrary, a dominant strategy is necessarily a better-response
strategy since it provides to a player higher payoff than any other strategy,
given any distribution of strategies of the other players.
In general, equilibrium behavior can be captured by considering the
“best-response preference relation” which qualifies the strategies that provide
to the player at least as high payoff as any other strategy, given the distribu-
tion of strategies of all other players. This way however, we lose information
since we cannot know how this player ranks the strategies that are not best-
responses. From the better-response preference relation it is always possible to
deduce the best-response preference relation by identifying the strategies that
are preferred over any other strategy (or that are equivalent). On the con-
trary, in most cases it is not possible to recover the better-response preference
relation just by examining the best-response preference relation.
Definition 23. Given a game GN , the better-response preference rela-
tion over strategies of player j ∈ N is a family of binary relations
<j on A× A and indexed by ∆#N−1(A)
that satisfies the following requirements:
(1) α jN,µN\{j} β if pj(α, µN\{j}) > pj(β, µN\{j}) and this means that
α <jN,µN\{j} β but not β <
j
N,µN\{j} α
(2) α ∼jN,µN\{j} β if p
j(α, µN\{j}) = pj(β, µN\{j}) and this means that
α <jN,µN\{j} β and also β <
j
N,µN\{j} α
57
The first requirement states that in GN , player j will prefer strategy α
over strategy β if strategy α provides her with a higher payoff than strategy β
given the distribution µN\{j} of strategies of all other players.
The second requirement states that in GN , player j will be indifferent
between strategy α and strategy β if strategy α provides her with the same payoff
as strategy β given the distribution µN\{j} of strategies of all other players.
Recall that the graph of a function f : X → Y is the set {(x, y)| y = f(x)} and
contains both the argument and the image. This way the graph of a preference
relation f : A× A×∆(A)→ A can be expressed as the set {(α, β, µ, α)| α 
β}. This means that when we compare strategy α with strategy β, given
the distribution µ, the outcome of the comparison is α (that provides higher
payoff).
Since we are comparing two strategies and we have to choose one of
them, the range is constrained to one of the two strategies under consideration.
Hence we could simplify notation and write {(α, β, µ)| α  β}. In the case
where α and β are equivalent and provide the same level of payoff, the graph
of this preference relation will contain both (α, β, µ) and (β, α, µ).
Most importantly, the graph of a preference relation contains the com-
plete structure of that preference relation, and knowing the graph we can
deduce the player’s preferences over her strategies.
2.7.2 Example: A game of coordination
Consider a game of coordination where a finite number of players is trying
to coordinate and choose the same strategy. In this game a player receives
maximum payoff if she chooses the same strategy with the majority of the
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players, and minimum payoff otherwise. Assume that A := {pull, push} is
the set of the two available strategies. Then the graph of the better-response
preference relation of a player is one of the following three:
(a)
{(push, pull, the majority of other players have chosen “push”)}
the above graph indicates that given the distribution of strategies “the ma-
jority of other players have chosen to push” the strategy “push” provides a
higher payoff than the strategy “pull”.
(b)
{(pull, push, the majority of other players have chosen “pull”)}
the above graph indicates that given the distribution of strategies “the major-
ity of other players have chosen to pull” the strategy “pull” provides a higher
payoff than the strategy “push”.
If we have odd number of players there is an additional case where the
graph of the better-response preference relation of a player consists of two
elements
(c)
{(push, pull, half of the players have chosen “push” and half have chosen “pull”),
(pull, push, half of the players have chosen “push” and half have chosen “pull”)}
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indicating that given this distribution of strategies “half of the players have
chosen to push and half have chosen to pull” the strategy “pull” provides the
same payoff with the strategy “push”.
2.7.3 Limiting-games and the graph of the Better-Response
correspondence of a game
Now we define the graph of the better-response correspondence of a game
which is the union of the graphs of better-response preference relations for all
players in the game.
Definition 24. Given a game GN the graph of the better-response cor-
respondence is the set
ΓN := {(j, λN , α, β, µN\{j}) ∈ I ×∆(I)× A2 ×∆(A)}
with strategies α and β such that
pj(α, µN\{j}) ≥ pj(β, µN\{j})
A typical element of this set indicates that for a player j ∈ N in the game with
player-set λN , given the distribution of strategies of all other players µN\{j} ∈
∆#N−1(A), strategy α that is listed first (compared to strategy β) provides
player j with at least as high payoff as strategy β that is listed second (compared
to strategy α).
Definition 25. An unrestricted game GI is a limiting-game if it is the
limit of an admissible sequence of games {GN}∞#N=2 as the number of play-
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ers increases. Equivalently, an unrestricted game GI is a limiting-game if
its better-response correspondence is the limit of a sequence of better-response
correspondences of restricted games {GN}∞#N=2.
We believe that the above requirement on better-response correspon-
dence is sufficient for a limiting-game to be a meaningful limit-abstraction
of the strategic environment of a large finite game. Under the above defini-
tion, when a sequence of games converges to a limiting-game, we know that
the better-response correspondence of the limiting-game is the limit of a se-
quence of better-response correspondences of the respective games. This has
an especially useful consequence: for any single player j in the game, given a
distribution of strategies of all other players which is the limit of a sequence
of restricted distributions of strategies, player j will rank her strategies in the
limiting-game approximately the same way that she would in a large finite
game. In turn, this has profound implications for the properties of Nash equi-
librium in such a metric space of games: we can avoid discontinuities in the
better-response preference relation that give rise to implausible preferences
over strategies and lead to implausible equilibria.
It is worth noting that in a limiting-game that is the limit of an admis-
sible sequence of games, a player may not have a well-defined payoff function.
This is not a problem because what we need is that a player, given a distri-
bution of strategies of all other players in the game, can compare any two of
her strategies based on the payoff that they provide to her. A well-defined
payoff function would additionally allow a player to compare any two of her
strategies given different distributions of strategies of all other players; this is
something that we do not require for our analysis.
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2.8 A metric space of games in distributional
form
In this section we define the distance between two games and then construct a
metric space of games in distributional form. Our analytical approach consists
of embedding the complete metric space of player-sets in distributional form
into a metric space of games in distributional form. Under this approach
the completeness property follows directly. This allows our results and the
corresponding proofs in the appendix to be particularly straightforward. In
this complete metric space of games, every game with infinitely-many players
is the limit of a sequence of countable games as the number of players increases.
Alternatively, every convergent sequence of games has a unique limiting-game,
up to an equivalence class.
2.8.1 The distance between games
We define the distance between any two games as the Hausdorff distance be-
tween the graphs of their better-response correspondences.
Consider the following metrics: the metric dI with respect to which I
is a complete metric space4, the Prohorov metric d∆(I) on ∆(I), the metric dA
on A, and the Prohorov metric d∆(A) on ∆(A).
Let
d1 :=
dI + d∆(I) + 2dA + d∆(A)
5
4Such a metric exists because I is a compact metrizable space by Theorem 3.28 in
Aliprantis and Border (2005).
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be a product metric on
I ×∆(I)× A2 ×∆(A)
The properties of semi-definiteness, symmetry, and triangle inequality of
dI , d∆(I), dA, and d∆(A) are preserved under addition and scalar multiplication
and therefore d1 is a well-defined metric on I × d∆(I) × A2 ×∆(A).
For sets of players N, N˜ ⊂ I the distance between any two games GN
and GN˜ is defined as follows
dg(GN , GN˜) := max{ sup
x∈ΓN
inf
x˜∈ΓN˜
d1(x, x˜), sup
x˜∈ΓN˜
inf
x∈ΓN
d1(x, x˜)}
2.8.2 Example: The distance between restricted Cournot
market games
We will apply our definition of the distance between two games to the restricted
Cournot market games GB = 〈λB, A, pB〉 and GK = 〈λK , A, pK〉.
The graph of GB is
ΓB := {(j, λB, αj, βj, 1
34
∑
i∈B\{j}
qi) ∈ B ×∆B(I)× A2 ×∆34(A)}
with strategies αj and βj such that
(1− 1
34
(
∑
i∈B\{j}
qi + αj)− c)αj ≥ (1− 1
34
(
∑
i∈B\{j}
qi + βj)− c)βj
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The graph of GK is
ΓK := {(j, λK , α˜j, β˜j, 1
34
∑
i∈K\{j}
qi) ∈ K ×∆K(I)× A2 ×∆34(A)}
with strategies α˜j and β˜j such that
(1− 1
34
(
∑
i∈K\{j}
qi + α˜j)− c)α˜j ≥ (1− 1
34
(
∑
i∈K\{j}
qi + β˜j)− c)β˜j
then the distance between GB and GK is
dg(GB, GK) := max{ sup
x∈ΓB
inf
x˜∈ΓK
d1(x, x˜), sup
x˜∈ΓK
inf
x∈ΓB
d1(x, x˜)}
2.8.3 Short note on the numerical calculation of the
Hausdorff and Prohorov metrics
We understand that calculating the value of the Hausdorff metric or the value
of the Prohorov metric can be a challenging task. Nonetheless, a researcher
does not have to deal with these numerical calculations in order to use our tools
and results. Analogously to the way that our proofs establish the validity of
our results, our examples aim to strengthen the intuition for the underlying
mechanism of our methodology. These examples are not necessarily a “user
guide” for researchers. Provided that a strategic situation can be modeled as a
game that satisfies our assumptions about the player-space, the action-space,
and the payoff functions, a researcher can use our analytical tools and invoke
our propositions to analyze this strategic situation.
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2.8.4 Completeness and the Better-Response correspon-
dence
Proposition 5. The metric space (G, dg) is complete.
A proof is provided in the Appendix.
In effect, Proposition 5 establishes the upper and lower hemicontinuity prop-
erty of the better-response correspondence of the games that belong to a com-
plete metric space (G, dg). For a game GL ∈ G the following two properties
are true:
(a) lower hemicontinuity: the graph of the better-response correspondence of
GL is the limit of a sequence of graphs of better-response correspondences
of restricted games GM with M ⊂ L
(b) upper hemicontinuity: the limit of any sequence of graphs of better-
response correspondences of restricted games GM ∈ G is the graph of
the better-response correspondence of a game GL ∈ G
The better-response correspondence includes the entire structure of
players’ preferences over their strategies. As such, the better-response cor-
respondence also includes the “best-response correspondence” that we will
define in the next section. The best-response correspondence is just a part of
the structure of players’ preferences over their strategies but it plays a key role
in the definition of Nash equilibrium since it characterizes a player’s “optimal”
strategies given what the other players have chosen to do. We have established
the upper and lower hemicontinuity of the better-response correspondence of
every game that belongs to (G, dg).
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2.9 Nash equilibrium and the Best-Response
correspondence
First, given a game GN , for each player i ∈ N we characterize the set of “best”
strategies for a given situation. We define for each player i ∈ N the set of all
strategies that, given the strategies of all other players, provide to player i at
least as high payoff as any other strategy. Then, a strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium of a game if every player employs a “best” strategy (see Definition
23 below).
Definition 26. Given a game GN := 〈λN , A, pN〉, the best-response cor-
respondence is the set-valued function Br : A×∆(A)→ 2A where 2A is the
family of all subsets of A. The set of best-responses for player i ∈ N is
Bri(µN\{i}) := {αi ∈ A| piN(αi;µN\{i}) ≥ piN(βi;µN\{i}) for every βi ∈ A}
Definition 27. Given a game GN := 〈λN , A, pN〉, a strategy profile AN where
αi is the strategy of player i is a Nash equilibrium of GN if
αi ∈ Bri(µN\{i}) for every i ∈ N
2.9.1 The graph of the Best-Response correspondence
of a game
Definition 28. The graph of the best-response correspondence of GN
is the set
{(i, λN , α, µN\{i})} ∈ I ×∆(I)× A×∆(A)}
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A typical element of this set indicates that:
- For player i ∈ I in the game with player-set λN ,
- given the distribution µN\{i} of strategies of all other players, that:
- strategy α provides to player i at least as high payoff as any other strategy
2.9.2 Completeness and the Best-Response correspon-
dence
Proposition 6. The metric space (B, d2) of graphs of best-response correspon-
dences is a complete metric space with respect to the product metric
d2 :=
dI + d∆(I) + dA + d∆(A)
4
on B := I ×∆(I)× A×∆(A)
A proof is provided in the Appendix.
The above result establishes that the best-response correspondence of
a limiting-game is the limit of a sequence of best-response correspondences
of restricted games, and also that when a sequence of games converges to a
limiting-game, the limit of the sequence of graphs of best-response correspon-
dences is the best-response correspondence of that limiting-game.
2.10 Strategic Dominance in Restricted games
and Nash equilibria of Limiting-games
The following result connects directly the first two chapters of this study. In
Chapter 1 we constructed a refinement of Nash equilibrium and demonstrated
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how it qualifies only plausible outcomes as equilibria of a game. Below we
discuss why an arbitrary game in our space of games has only plausible Nash
equilibria, and therefore we should expect no discontinuities in equilibrium
behavior as the number of players increases.
2.10.1 Dominant strategies
Recall from Chapter 1 that a strategy is µ-dominant if it provides at least as
high payoff to player j as any other strategy given µN\{j} and for any sequence
{µN\{j}}#N≥m of distributions of strategies of all other players that converges
to µ. A µ-dominant strategy is not necessarily a “dominant strategy”. This
is because a µ-dominant strategy provides to j at least as high payoff as any
other strategy, only for µN\{j} or for sequences {µN\{j}}#N≥m that converge
to µ, but not for any distribution of strategies of all other players. On the
contrary, a dominant strategy is necessarily a µ-dominant strategy since it
provides to j higher payoff than any other strategy, given any distribution of
strategies of the other players.
Note that if a limiting-game G belongs to a complete metric space of
games G, and in an arbitrarily large restricted game GN ∈ G for player j ∈ N
there exists a µ-dominant strategy αj then in a Nash equilibrium of G (with
induced distribution of strategies µ) player j will choose strategy αj (or an
equivalent strategy).
The above statement is true because, in a complete metric space of
games, the best-response correspondence of a limiting-game is the limit of
a sequence of best-response correspondences of restricted games. Therefore if
strategy αj is a best-response given µN\{j} and for any sequence {µN\{j}}#N≥m
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of distributions of strategies of all other players that converges to µ, then
strategy αj also is a best-response in the limiting-game given µ and in a Nash
equilibrium of G (with induced distribution of strategies µ) player j will choose
strategy αj (or an equivalent strategy).
It follows that if a limiting-game G belongs to a complete metric space
of games G, and in an arbitrarily large restricted game GN ∈ G for player
j ∈ N there exists a dominant strategy αj then in a Nash equilibrium of G
(with induced distribution of strategies µ) player j will choose strategy αj (or
an equivalent strategy).
2.10.2 Dominated strategies
Recall from Chapter 1 that a strategy βj is αjµ-dominated if it provides lower
payoff to player j than the strategy αj given µN\{j} and for any sequence
{µN\{j}}#N≥m of distributions of strategies of all other players that converges
to µ. An αjµ-dominated strategy is not necessarily a “dominated strategy”.
This happens for two reasons: first because an αjµ-dominated strategy is not
dominated in given any distribution of strategies of all other players, but only
given the given µN\{j} and for any sequence {µN\{j}}#N≥m of distributions of
strategies of all other players that converges to µ. On the contrary, a domi-
nated strategy is necessarily an αjµ-dominated strategy since it is dominated
given any distribution of strategies of the other players.
Note that if a limiting-game G belongs to a complete metric space of
games G then a Nash equilibrium of G (with induced distribution of strategies
µ) cannot involve strategies that are αjµ-dominated for some player j ∈ I.
The above statement is true because, in a complete metric space of
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games, the best-response correspondence of a limiting-game is the limit of
a sequence of best-response correspondences of restricted games. Therefore if
strategy βj is not a best-response given µN\{j} and for any sequence {µN\{j}}#N≥m
of distributions of strategies of all other players that converges to µ, then strat-
egy βj also is not a best-response in the limiting-game given µ and in a Nash
equilibrium of G (with induced distribution of strategies µ) player j will not
choose strategy βj.
It follows that G if a limiting-game G belongs to a complete metric
space of games G then a Nash equilibrium of G (with induced distribution of
strategies µ) cannot involve strategies that are dominated for some player
j ∈ I.
2.11 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we set the theoretical underpinnings for a new framework for the
study of games with many players. The cornerstone of our foundations consists
of the concepts of distributional form of a player-set, and completeness of a
space of games. The distributional form reduces a player-set into a probability
distribution with support that specific player-set. This allows us to compare
player-sets and games with different number or different labels of players.
Completeness of a space of games implies that certain desirable properties
are preserved as the number of players increases. These desirable properties
involve equilibrium behavior regarding strategic dominance as the number of
players increases, and endow our analytical approach with consistency in terms
of what is considered to be a plausible outcome of a game with many players.
Our goal is to formulate a basis for a straightforward framework with
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three basic characteristics: intuition, consistency, and functionality. We be-
lieve that we have achieved all three goals.
i. Intuition: the properties of our tools follow from their definitions and we
can dispense with elaborate constructs and proofs. We provide a number
of examples that illustrate our tools and reinforce understanding of the
underlying mechanism.
ii. Consistency: we build our set of tools virtually from scratch5 and at each
step we establish results that test and confirm its structural integrity.
iii. Functionality: at each building step we provide fully worked-through ex-
amples of strategic environments amenable to analysis using our tools,
and explain exactly how our tools apply to these environments.
The bottom line is that, in addition to the tools that we developed,
we also developed an analytical approach based on complete spaces of games
with countably-many players, where Nash equilibrium constitutes a plausible
prediction of how the modeled strategic situation will be resolved.
2.12 Appendix
2.12.1 Proof of Proposition 4
The metric space (∆(I), d∆(I)) of player-sets in distributional form is complete.
Proof. The result follows as soon as we notice that ∆(I) is a compact and
totally bounded metric space, and as such it is also complete.6
5Our set of tools is constructed from scratch as regards the economic theory and game
theory; inevitably and unregrettably we rely heavily on mathematical results of topology
and measure theory.
6In fact, every compact metric space is also totally bounded but for the sake of clarity
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2.12.2 Proof of Proposition 5
The metric space (G, dg) is complete.
Proof. Note that the Hausdorff metric that defines dg involves only the prod-
uct metric d1. Since the Hausdorff metric inherits completeness (Munkres
(2000)), in order to prove that (G, dg) is complete it is sufficient to show that
d1 is complete on I ×∆(I)× A2 ×∆(A)
If a metric space can be expressed as the product of finitely-many complete
spaces, then by a corollary of Tychonoff’s Theorem (Aliprantis and Border
(2005)) also this metric space is complete. Hence, to show that d1 is a complete
metric on I×∆(I)×A2×∆(A) it is sufficient to show that each metric involved
in this product metric is complete on its respective space.
i. The metric space (I, dI) is compact by construction and since every
compact metric space is also totally bounded, this space is also complete.
ii. By Proposition 4 the metric space (∆(I), d∆(I) is complete.
iii. The metric space (A, dA) is compact by assumption and therefore by
Theorem 6.4 in Parthasarathy (1967) the metric space (∆(A), d∆(A)) is
also compact and hence both are complete.
Therefore d1 is complete on I ×∆(I)×A2 ×∆(A) and consequently (G, dg)
is complete.
we mention here both properties.
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2.12.3 Proof of Proposition 6
The metric space (B, d2) of graphs of best-response correspondences is a com-
plete metric space with respect to the product metric
d2 :=
dI + d∆(I) + dA + d∆(A)
4
on B := I ×∆(I)× A×∆(A)
Proof. In Proposition 5 we proved that (I, dI), (∆(I), d∆(I)), (A, dA), and
(∆(A), d∆(A)) are complete metric spaces. Then by a corollary of Tychonoff’s
Theorem (Aliprantis and Border (2005)) also the metric space (B, d2, ) is
complete.
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Chapter 3
Complete Spaces of Games with
Types
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we apply the tools that we developed in Chapter 2 to games
where players can possibly be grouped into “types”. Each player has a type
that summarizes attributes that are relevant to the game. Harsanyi (1967)
introduced the concept of player-types in game theory by assuming that the
players are randomly drawn from certain populations of individuals of possi-
bly different characteristics or attribute vectors. Nevertheless, Harsanyi (1967)
proposed player-types in an incomplete information setting while we are using
player-types in a complete information setting. A simple example would be the
case of a government that wishes to impose a tax but cannot fully customize
the tax amount to each individual’s unique characteristics due to the associ-
ated complexity cost. Therefore, the government implements a tax-plan based
on three “types” of individuals: “married with children”, “married without
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children”, and “single”.
In this chapter we map the player-space I to a type-space T which is a
non-empty countably-infinite closed and metrizable set, exactly as I. We can
readily extend many of our definitions and constructs, and we do not need to
go through every single step as we did in Chapter 2. Even though we move
faster in sections that share the same motivation with those of Chapter 2, we
do provide fully worked-through examples of how our concepts and tools apply
to strategic environments with possibly different types of players.
We underline that our study involves exclusively non-cooperative games
where players are not allowed to cooperate with each other in their choice of
strategy. Every player contemplates unilateral moves and deviations of herself
and not of a group of players. Because of non-cooperation the bearing of some
of our tools on the case of games with types is limited. Below we explain how
and why.
In Chapter 2 we defined the distributional form of a player-set. This
concept applies in a qualitatively new way to the case of players with types.
The distributional form of a player-set with types captures the proportion of
players that are of each type. Two or more players can be of the same type
and our examples demonstrate also the case of non-equiprobable measures.
Nonetheless, in a game in distributional form, typically players’ equilib-
rium behavior will be independent of the possibility of players being grouped
into types. This happens because players are simply not allowed to cooperate
with players of the same type. At equilibrium, players of the same type may
choose the same strategy exactly because they are of the same type but this
coincidence is not part of their assumed strategic behavior. Their decision
process does not include the fact they belong to a group of players with the
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same type. On that account, our analysis of Chapter 2 applies directly to the
case of games with types.
In Section 2 we define the space of players’ types and explain how our
analytical approach applies to games with countably many types of players.
Given a set of players we define a “type-profile” which is a list of the players’
types, and a “type-profile in distributional form” which consists of a proba-
bility measure on the space of types. This probability measure singles-out the
types that are present in the type-profile by assigning non-zero weight to the
types present in the type-profile, and zero weight to other types.
In Section 3 we provide an example of a complete metric space of firms
with types, and in Section 4 an example of an unrestricted and a restricted
game with types using type-profiles in distributional form.
3.2 The players’ space and types’ space
In Chapter 2 we identified players according to their name or “label”. The
space of all potential players was denoted by
I := {1, 1
2
, ...,
m
n
, ... | m < n and m,n ∈ N} ∪ {0}
and its elements where the labels of the players. In this chapter we enrich
the space of players by allowing players to be grouped into possibly different
“types”. We assume that each player i ∈ I can be sufficiently described by
her type ti ∈ T which contains all relevant information including the player’s
preferences over outcomes and the way that her actions affect the payoff of
other players. Players i, j ∈ I are considered to be of the same type if ti = tj
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for ti, tj ∈ T .
To this purpose we define a “type-space” of players
T := {t1, t 12 , ..., tmn , ... | m < n and m,n ∈ N} ∪ {0}
which is a non-empty countably-infinite closed and metrizable set and contains
the types of players in I. In our case T is a compact metrizable space by
the Heine-Borel Theorem (Aliprantis and Border (2005)) since it is closed,
bounded, and metrizable.
In the following definition we make clear the relationship between the
player-sets of Chapter 2 and the type-profiles of this chapter.
Definition 29. Given a set of players
N := (1,
1
2
, ..,
m
n
, ...) ⊆ I
its type-profile is the set
TN := (t
1, t
1
2 , ..., t
m
n , ...) ⊆ T
where ti ∈ TN is the type of player i ∈ N .
For each type-profile TN ⊂ T we define a Borel probability measure
λTN ∈ ∆(T ) that satisfies the following:
1. the support of λTN consists of at most #TN atoms (the types of players),
2. λTN ({ti}) ∈ (0, 1] for each ti ∈ TN ,
3. λTN ({ti} /∈ TN) = 0 and λTN (TN) = 1.
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Since T is a compact metrizable space the support of λN ∈ ∆(T ) al-
ways exists (Chapter II Parthasarathy (1967) and Theorem 12.14 Aliprantis
and Border (2005)). Endowed with the weak-convergence topology ∆(T ) is
a compact space like T (Theorem 15.11 Aliprantis and Border (2005)). The
associated Prohorov metric is denoted by d∆(T ).
In the following definition we make precise the notion of a type-profile in
distributional form. Two different type-profiles may involve not only different
types of players but also different number of types. The distributional form
maps each type-profile to a pair consisting of the cardinality of the set and
a probability measure on T . This way, the distributional form provides a
convenient way of comparing type-profiles of different size and contents.
Definition 30. Given a type-space T , the distributional form of a type-
profile TN ⊆ T consists of a probability measure λTN ∈ ∆(T ) whose support is
the type-profile TN . The weight of type t
i ∈ T is a positive number less than
1 if ti ∈ TN and 0 if ti /∈ TN .
From here on we consider exclusively type-profiles such as
TN := (t
1, t
1
2 , ..., t
m
n , ...)
and we can in effect ignore the corresponding player-sets
N := (1,
1
2
, ..,
m
n
, ...)
without losing any information.
We simplify notation by
(a) denoting the type profile TN simply by N , the related player-set that
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generated TN
(b) using simply j instead of tj to denote the type of player j
Note that according to our definition, players i, j ∈ I are considered to
be of the same type if ti = tj for ti, tj ∈ T . Nonetheless, with our simplification
of notation in (b) we should allow for i, j ∈ T to possibly be of the same type
even though numerically it may be the case that i 6= j. For example, 1 and
1
2
may represent the same type even though 1 6= 1
2
. This could happen in
theory but, to minimize confusion, in our examples we use the same number
to represent two players of the same type and avoid using different numbers
to represent the same type.
3.2.1 Example: Sets of firms with types
Consider T := {1, ..., m
n
, ... | m < n and m,n ∈ N} ∪ {0} denoting the types
of firms in a market game. First we consider a type-profile B where each type
appears at least twice. The restricted type-profile of firms
B := {1, 1, 1
2
,
1
2
, ...,
9
10
,
9
10
} ⊂ T
has type-profile distributional form λB with
λB({1}) = λB({1
6
}) = λB({m
n
| 0 < m < n ≤ 10 and m,n ∈ N}) = 2
92
since each of these types appears twice in B, and
λB({1
4
}) = λB({1
5
}) = λB({2
5
}) = λB({3
5
}) = λB({4
5
}) = 4
92
79
since each of these types appears four times in B, and
λB({1
2
}) = 10
92
since
1
2
appears ten times in B
and
λB({1
3
}) = 6
92
since
1
3
appears six times in B
and 0 weight is assigned to types not present in B.
Consider a different restricted type-profile of firms
K := {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1
4
,
1
9
, ...,
mm
nn
, ...
99
1010
} ⊂ T
The distributional form of K is λK) with
λK({m
m
nn
| m < n < 10 and m,n ∈ N}) = 1
50
and
λK({1}) = λK({1
4
}) = 5
50
since type 1 appears five times
and
λK({1
9
}) = λK({4
9
}) = 3
50
since each of these types appears three times
and
λK({ 1
16
}) = λK({ 9
16
}) = λK({ 1
25
}) = 2
50
since each of these types appears twice
and 0 weight is assigned to types not present in K. Note that B 6⊂ K since
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the type 1
2
belongs to B but not to K also K 6⊂ B since the type 99
1010
belongs
to K but not to B.
Now we can proceed to compare the two type-profiles and see the advan-
tages of the distributional form. The original type-profiles B and K not only
have not equal cardinality but also have different contents (different players).
On the other hand, λB and λK are both probability measures and comparison
is possible.
3.3 Cournot market game with types in dis-
tributional form
Here we apply our definition of a game in distributional form (Section 2.5)
to the case of a Cournot market game with possibly different types of firms.
Consider the limiting Cournot market game with firm-types
GT = 〈λ,A, p〉
Each firm with type j ∈ T chooses a level of production of a single homoge-
neous good
qj ∈ Aj ⊆ A := [0, qmax] ∩Q
and faces c ∈ [0, 1) unit cost of production. Assume that P (Q) = 1−Q relates
the price P of the good with the average quantity available Q :=
∫
T q
idλ. The
payoff function of a firm j ∈ T can be identified with its profit function
pj(qj,
∫
T
qidλ; c) := (1−
∫
T
qidλ− c)qj
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A restricted Cournot market game with firm-types is
GK = 〈λK , A, pK〉
with λK as described previously.
The action space is the same as in the previous example, and P (Q) =
1 − Q relates the price P of the good with the average quantity available
Q := 1
50
∑
i∈K q
i. Then payoff function of firm with type j is now
pj(qj,
1
50
∑
i∈K
qi; c) := (1− 1
50
∑
i∈K
qi − c)qj
We see that in both the unrestricted GT and in the restricted game GK all
parameters of a game: the space of participants, the action-space, and the
payoff function of each participant, are defined and consequently both games
are well-defined.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we demonstrated how our analytical approach of Chapter 2
applies to games where players can possibly be grouped into different types.
The type of a player summarizes her attributes that are relevant to the game.
The results of Chapter 2 apply directly to the analysis of games with types:
instead of having participating players in the game, in Chapter 3 we have
participating types of players. This is mainly because we work in a space of
participants that has the same mathematical properties as that of Chapter 2:
a non-empty countably-infinite closed and metrizable space.
We defined all relevant type-profiles, distributional forms, and presented
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fully worked-through examples of applications of our analytical tools. We
skipped the parts where the analysis of Chapter 2 applies directly and focused
on the parts that are qualitatively different from Chapter 2.
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